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1. Introduction 
 
The more active role the U. S. Supreme Court has taken in American society and the 
increased ideological polarization in Washington have led to sharply contested Supreme 
Court nominations in the last four decades. Looking at developments starting with 
President Richard Nixon’s nominations, it is possible to identify some major trends. The 
later nominations have involved more interests groups with increased influence, more 
scrutiny of the candidates’ personalities and backgrounds, more news media coverage, 
and Senate hearings with tougher questions. These factors in turn influence the president 
when he is considering possible candidates and how they might fare. Contrary to what 
one might expect, nominees who have clear records of an ideological affiliation are still 
nominated and often confirmed, defying factors like fierce rhetoric from opponents, 
threats of filibuster, and news media digging into their track record. This thesis will trace 
developments through the twenty nominations starting with Richard Nixon’s presidency 
to document the major changes in the nomination process and the factors that seem to 
decide whether a nomination will succeed or not. 
When Richard Nixon became president in 1969 he had a clear philosophy of the 
kind of justices he wanted, and he was not hesitant about nominating ideological 
candidates and promoting his conservative view of how the Supreme Court should act. 
Nixon appointed a total of four justices and had the opportunity to shape a Court which 
was dominated by liberal justices. Nixon’s rhetoric, which called for justices who were 
“strict constructionists,” was adopted by future Republican presidents. During the period 
covered in this thesis, there were only two Democratic presidents: Jimmy Carter and Bill 
Clinton. Only Clinton had vacancies on the Court, and his two nominations are the only 
of these twenty that were put forth by a Democratic president. The two parties have used 
different judicial strategies. Republicans have to a large extent been able to shape the 
federal judiciary because they have controlled the presidency for most of the period. 
Federal court appointments have also been a greater priority for them. Later in the period 
Democrats started to put more efforts into resisting judicial appointments both regarding 
the Supreme Court and lower courts. 
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The conflict between conservatives and liberals is framing the public debate about 
the Supreme Court. Issues like abortion, gay rights, affirmative action, the death penalty, 
and the role of religion in public life are likely to get media attention and to cause interest 
groups to get involved. During nomination hearings in the Senate these issues are 
frequently presented to the nominee in various ways with the hope of getting a hint about 
his or her philosophy. Justices are usually labeled as conservative, liberal, or moderate. 
The labels will be used when appropriate since the literature is largely in agreement about 
which justices fits them. 
In order to get an overview of the nominations, several types of sources will be 
used. The most useful primary sources are the transcripts of the hearings in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, where the nominee testifies. Transcripts of the president’s 
nomination speech will show how he chose to present the nominee. These are usually 
made available online by the Library of Congress or newspapers.  
News articles and opinion pieces written at the time of the nomination will give 
an insight into the reactions to events from various players. Most frequently used is The 
New York Times. It has a vast online archive that has been used for quotations as well as 
facts and numbers. Although The New York Times usually supports liberal candidates and 
opposes conservative candidates, quotes and factual information are presumed to be 
reliable. Various opinion pieces are attributed to the author with some information of his 
or her political affiliation.  
The academic literature about the Supreme Court is greatly varied. Works like 
Storm Center by David M. O’Brien offers a useful overview of the Court’s functions and 
history while not arguing any political views and has a great number of sources. Other 
general works about the Court with important insights are God Save This Honorable 
Court by Laurence Tribe and The Supreme Court by Jeffrey Rosen. These provide 
general perspectives about the developments on the Court. 
There are several academic works that look into the topic of nominations 
specifically. Some are general in their approach and present original research and 
statistics, like Advice and Consent by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, A Political 
History of Appointments to the Supreme Court by Henry J. Abraham, Strategic Selection 
by Christine L. Nemacheck, and The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees by John 
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Anthony Maltese. Others have more specific arguments, like Richard Davis’ Electing 
Justice, which argues that the nomination process is broken and should be replaced by a 
better system, Mark Silverstein’s Judicious Choices, which describes what he considers 
the intense partisan nature of nominations, and Herman Schwartz’ Right Wing Justice, 
which argues that conservatives have been successful in taking over the courts by 
questionable methods. These three works, and several others like them, are relatively 
recent and offer interesting perspectives since their research has not yet been integrated 
into the general literature about the Court.  
Popular literature about the Court, for lack of a better term, can also prove very 
useful. In this category I place works like The Brethren by Bob Woodward and Scott 
Armstrong, The Nine by Jeffrey Toobin, Supreme Conflict by Jan Crawford Greenburg, 
and various biographies of presidents and justices. Several of these works have few 
sources, since they are mostly based on anonymous interviews with justices, their clerks, 
and people in the White House. Yet they provide a very interesting, and some times the 
only, insight into the decision-making process by the president and his staff and the life at 
the Supreme Court. 
I plan to address several developments in the nomination process during this 
period. Qualifications and the amount of controversy would appear to be obvious factors 
in predicting whether a nomination will succeed or not. But presidents have nominated 
several candidates with questionable qualifications and with controversial backgrounds, 
and the motivations that led to those nominations are also valuable to investigate. As 
public debate and news media coverage have increased, several ideological candidates 
have still been confirmed. I will discuss both failed and successful nominations in order 
to find out to what extent qualifications and controversies decide how a nomination turns 
out compared to other factors. 
 
1.1 The Structure of the Thesis 
To set the stage for the discussion of individual nominations, a background section is 
needed. That section will explain how the Supreme Court works and give a brief history 
of the Court. The main part of the thesis is the discussions of each nomination. All 
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nominations have their own section and will be discussed in chronological order, 
categorized and summarized for each president. This approach will make it easier to 
observe trends as they have emerged. Each nomination will be considered for its 
importance, and comparisons will be drawn to earlier and future nominations when 
relevant. At the end of the thesis a concluding section will analyze trends across the 
nominations that are covered. 
I will cover twenty nominations in the period from the start of Nixon’s presidency 
in 1969 to the end of George W. Bush’s presidency in 2009. Technically, there were 
twenty-one nominations in this period. John Roberts was nominated for Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s seat, but when Chief Justice Rehnquist died, Robert’s nomination was 
withdrawn and he was re-nominated for Rehnquist’s seat. Since this withdrawal occurred 
for practical reasons and Roberts was immediately re-nominated, the number of 
nominations will be referred to as twenty for analytical purposes. Twenty is a small 
sample and makes it necessary to be cautious when drawing conclusions. Each 
nomination will be summarized covering factors such as the timing of the nomination, 
political circumstances, diversity and ideology concerns on the Court, presidential 
approach, the Senate hearings, news media and interest groups, qualifications of the 
nominee, and controversies. 
These factors are broad and encompassing, and their purpose is simply to provide 
a framework that will ensure that nominations are covered in a similar way for easier 
comparison. Not all of them are equally relevant for all nominations, and the amount of 
discussion will vary for individual nominations.  
In the concluding section each of these factors will be discussed with the whole 
period in mind to explain how and why the playing field of the nomination game has 
changed and what seems to decide whether a nomination will succeed or not. 
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2. Background 
 
Controversy regarding judicial appointments is not a new phenomenon. The structure of 
the federal judiciary was loosely outlined in the Constitution, but presidents and senators 
have since sought to fill vacancies with their political or ideological allies. The role of the 
Supreme Court, the number of justices, and the practices of Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearings have also changed over time. The Supreme Court has always had an important 
role in politics, but during the 20th century its power increased as it involved itself to a 
larger degree in controversial issues and thereby raised the stakes for appointments. 
 There are three branches of government: The judicial branch, the executive 
branch, and the legislative branch. The Supreme Court is at the top of the judicial branch 
and the highest court in the country. The Court can be a check on the powers of the other 
branches, by deciding whether a law passed by Congress or an action by the president is 
constitutional. 
The federal system in the United States consists of two parallel court systems. 
State courts rule on state laws and matters that are within state jurisdiction. Some crimes 
and some matters are federal by statute or by the Constitution and are dealt with in the 
federal system. There are three levels of federal courts for general jurisdiction: the district 
courts, the circuit courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the 
ultimate court of appeal for both systems, and it can review cases from both federal and 
state courts as long as the cases deal with constitutional issues and represent substantial 
federal questions. Several thousand cases are appealed to the Supreme Court each year, 
but less than a hundred are currently heard.  
The nine justices and their clerks review the petitions, and to hear a case a 
minimum of four justices must vote in favor of accepting it. When a case is accepted by 
the Court, it is granted certiorari. The parties in the case prepare briefs that the justices 
read. Then an oral argument is scheduled where they argue their case before the Court. 
After the argument the justices meet in conference and discuss the case and take a 
preliminarily vote. It takes a minimum of five justices to decide a case, after which an 
opinion of the Court is written. The justices might disagree about the reasoning but still 
agree on the outcome, and several concurring opinions might be announced. The justices 
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in the minority may write their dissenting opinions. During the writing process justices 
might still change their views and opinions are not final until announced by the Court. 
During this period justices write drafts and may exchange them and discuss possible 
changes with a hope of convincing others. 
Supreme Court justices do not have fixed tenures but serve “during good 
Behavior” (US Constitution, Article III). Unless a justice acts in a way that could justify 
impeachment, he or she has a lifetime appointment and will likely be on the Court for 
several decades. The majority of justices are in their late forties to early sixties when 
appointed to the Court, and it is not uncommon that they serve into their eighties before 
they retire. They will often time their retirements to occur at the end of a term, and avoid 
simultaneous retirements. There is often speculation about justices retiring after the 
election of a president that shares their ideology. One term in the Supreme Court lasts 
from October to June (US Supreme Court, “The Court”). Some times, usually because of 
illness or death, there are retirements or nominations occurring simultaneously. That was 
the case when Justice O’Connor retired in 2005, and Chief Justice Rehnquist died a few 
months later. Rehnquist had planned to stay another year, which was why O’Connor 
chose to retire at that time. Some justices inform the president beforehand that they plan 
to retire, while others do not offer any prior notice. A planned retirement at the end of the 
term gives the president and the Senate several months during the summer to nominate 
and confirm a replacement. 
The leader of the Court is called the Chief Justice, and the other eight members 
are Associate Justices. Justices hire up to four clerks each; these are usually graduates 
from top law schools, and they usually serve for one term. The Chief Justice’s vote does 
not count more than that of any other justice, but his position is still important as the 
public face of the Court. The most senior justice assigns the opinion writing on his or her 
side. The Chief is always the most senior justice, and always assigns the writing of the 
opinion for his side. The power of assignment gives the Chief power to influence the 
outcome. If a moderate justice appears to agree with the Chief, it might be strategic to 
assign him or her to write the opinion and hope that it will convince him or her as well as 
other undecided justices. Another concern is to assign opinions in such a way that all 
justices get similar shares of important and less important opinions. Some Chiefs have 
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mastered this game, while others have failed and created tensions within the Court. The 
Chief also has some additional administrative duties, such as keeping records of 
conferences and how justices indicate they will vote.  
Chief Justice nominations usually receive more attention than other nominations. 
If a current justice is promoted to Chief, another person will have to be nominated for his 
or her seat. There will then be two nominations and a possibility for more controversy 
and political games. But it can also be beneficial to the president since the attention and 
controversy is split between the two, and a candidate that would otherwise have been 
thoroughly scrutinized might be overshadowed by the other candidate. 
When there is a vacancy on the Court, the president nominates a candidate. 
Presidential advisors usually research and vet a number of candidates first to be certain 
that the candidate to some extent shares the president’s political views. In many cases, 
and especially in recent years, the president’s team has investigated possible candidates 
even before a vacancy is known. The candidate needs to have relevant experience for the 
job, or opponents will bring that up during the hearings. Any scandals or unfavorable 
revelations about the candidate’s past are likely to greatly reduce the chances of 
confirmation.  
The president usually interviews a couple of candidates before he decides on the 
nominee. This is a more recent phenomenon and shows that presidents now pay more 
attention to Court appointments. He then usually holds a press conference with the 
nominee. Prior to the announcement there is often an attempt to keep the name of the 
nominee secret. This way the announcement will dominate the news and critics will have 
to spend some time to prepare their reactions against the nominee. In some cases the 
president and the nominee know each other, and the presidents who have stayed close 
with justices after their appointments have probably benefited from having more insight 
into what is going on at the Court. Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Abe Fortas, his close 
friend and advisor, to the Court, and Richard Nixon knew Chief Justice Burger well. 
Interest groups try to influence the president and the public about what kind of 
person should be chosen and how the eventual nominee should be perceived. The 
president has to convince interest groups that normally support him that the candidate is 
credible and will live up to their expectations. There is also a concern to try to avoid 
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heavy criticism from interest groups that oppose the president’s agenda. These groups 
have considerable power to influence the public through advertising campaigns and 
letter-writing campaigns to senators. Richard Davis argues in Electing Justice that with 
the interest group involvement and pressuring of senators the nomination process is 
similar to an election except for the lack of a vote by the people. On the liberal side some 
important players are: The National Organization for Women (NOW), the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), and People for the American Way. Some important 
conservative players are the Federalist Society, the American Center for Law and Justice, 
and various religious groups. 
A nominee is likely to fare better in the Senate if the president’s party is in the 
majority, though in several cases nominees do not have support from all senators from 
the president’s party. The reason can be either that the candidate perceived as too extreme 
as in the case of Robert Bork, or not sufficiently ideological as in the case of Harriet 
Miers. Senators have concerns that may change with the election cycle as well as other 
individual agendas, which makes it hard for the president to predict how they will vote. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee conducts hearings in which the nominee is asked 
about his or her judicial philosophy. The hearings usually last from two to five days and 
include the nominee as well as witnesses from various organizations. At the end of these 
hearings, the committee votes on the nominee before sending the nomination to the full 
Senate. The result of the Judiciary Committee vote is only advisory, but it carries a lot of 
weight. The full Senate has the final say as to whether the nominee is confirmed or 
rejected, by a simple majority vote. Complicating the voting process is the possibility of a 
filibuster, where a minority might block the nominee unless the majority can get 60% to 
vote for confirmation. This option is very rarely used in Supreme Court nominations, but 
is often mentioned as a possibility. 
Justices who have served for a while will usually get categorized in the media and 
academic literature as liberals, centrists, or conservatives. Conservative justices usually 
oppose business regulation and affirmative action and are in favor of limiting the reach of 
the federal government in relation to the states. There is also a strong social conservatism 
and willingness to allow public expression of religion, in some cases sponsored by the 
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state, and fierce opposition to abortion. These concerns sometimes override the idea of 
restricting government intervention. Liberals are more positive towards social policies 
and reforms initiated by the federal government, as well as affirmative action and privacy 
rights. They want to uphold the right of a woman to have an abortion, which in Roe v. 
Wade in 1973 was ruled as a matter of the right to privacy. 
Some terms should be clarified as they are important to the public debate about 
the Supreme Court and for this thesis. The terms “strict constructionist” or “originalist” 
describe someone who claims to hold firm to the literal text of the Constitution and who 
does not believe in significant evolution of meaning since the Founding Fathers wrote the 
document. The term is usually used by conservatives to signal that they want someone 
who is not an “activist,” implying that a “strict constructionist” would simply look to the 
Constitution and determine if the matter at hand squares with the text or not. Seemingly 
this would make the job of a justice rather easy. The “strict constructionist” view has 
been challenged as an impossible exercise by several scholars, among them Harvard Law 
Professor Laurence Tribe (Tribe 50).   
Liberals, on the other hand, now tend to focus on terms like “precedent” and 
“rights.” They believe that several rights, including the right to privacy, are implied in the 
Constitution even if they are not specifically mentioned. Liberals are usually in favor of 
interpreting the Constitution more broadly, which means rights should extend to more 
people than what the Founding Fathers expressed and that these rights can evolve over 
time. The expansion of the 14th Amendment to apply to states and the right to privacy 
have gradually been implemented by the Court, and liberals are now to a large extent in 
favor of upholding such precedents. The Warren Court, which made many of these 
decisions, had less regard for the previous precedent. Terms like these are frequently used 
to signal to constituencies whether a nominee is acceptable or not. The judicial term for 
precedence is “stare decisis” and it is respected to some degree by both liberals and 
conservatives, though often depending on the specific matter that is before the Court. 
Several justices have turned out to be different from what was expected of them. 
Presidents are eager to avoid a nominee that will drift toward the other side of the 
political spectrum. In some situations, often when the president has other important 
concerns or a low approval rating, he will nominate a candidate not particularly to his 
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liking but who will be approved easily in the Senate. Several of the candidates that have 
been labeled “moderate” have ended up on the other side of the spectrum compared to the 
president who appointed them. Moving toward the liberal side is more common than a 
move in the other direction, which has led conservative activists to be very suspicious of 
candidates who do not have clear conservative records. 
 
2.1 History of the Supreme Court 
During the constitutional convention in Philadelphia in 1787, there was conflict over the 
extent of the power of the president compared to that of Congress. Those who favored a 
strong executive wanted the president to appoint judges, while those who were in favor of 
a strong legislative branch wanted Congress to do it. The result was a compromise, where 
the president nominates a candidate, and the Senate provides “advice and consent,” which 
today means confirming or rejecting the nominee by a simple majority vote. The 
questions of qualifications and tenure were adopted from the British tradition, where 
judges served “during good behavior” (Epstein 7). Alexander Hamilton argued in the 
Federalist Papers that the federal judiciary should stay above politics and ideological 
influence (Ibid. 10). Since the “good behavior” requirement in practice means life tenure, 
judges have a great deal of independence from the other branches and need not worry too 
much about day-to-day politics, reelection, or being unpopular with the ruling party. To 
remove a justice, he or she would either have to be persuaded to resign or be impeached.  
 The Supreme Court defined its role and increased its power decisively in 1803, 
when in Marbury v. Madison it ruled that it had the authority to decide the 
constitutionality of laws. The case dealt with the appointment of Judge William Marbury 
as a Justice of the Peace by outgoing president John Adams. Adams had appointed a large 
number of judges during his last days in office, and it was considered a political move to 
assure that Adams’ ideological allies could dominate the judiciary when his opponent 
Thomas Jefferson took over the presidency. Marbury sued when Jefferson’s Secretary of 
State, James Madison, refused to deliver the commission so he could begin to work. 
Chief Justice John Marshall, an appointee of Adams, ruled with a unanimous court that 
“Marbury did indeed have a right to his commission, but the Supreme Court could not 
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order Madison to deliver it because the federal statute that authorized the Court to issue 
orders of that kind was itself unconstitutional” (Rosen 31). Thereby, the Court had 
established its power of judicial review, meaning it had the final say in whether laws 
were constitutional or not. The Jefferson administration did not protest the outcome, as it 
did not have to put Adams’ judge in office. This changed the Court’s role, as its main role 
in the future would be to consider the constitutionality of laws and practices.  
 The judiciary and the executive branches have had several conflicts over the 
years. In 1832, President Andrew Jackson famously stated “John Marshall has made his 
decision, now let him enforce it” when the Supreme Court denied state courts jurisdiction 
over crimes in Indian territory (Rosen 67). During the Civil War, President Abraham 
Lincoln defied writs of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Roger Taney (O’Brien 
335). The Court cannot do much if there is no willingness by the executive to enforce its 
rulings.  
There has never been any formal limit on the number of justices on the court. 
When the court was established in 1789, the number of justices was six. As the nation 
grew, additional Justices were added for each new circuit. In 1863, Abraham Lincoln 
added a tenth justice, with the creation of the 10th circuit in the West, and secured a pro-
Union court at the same time (O’Brien 348). President Andrew Johnson was prohibited 
from appointing new justices because Congress had passed a law that ensured the next 
three retirements would not be replaced. Two justices retired and no new ones were 
named until President Ulysses S. Grant was elected president and Congress authorized 
nine Justices (Ibid. 349). The number has stayed the same since 1869, despite an attempt 
by Franklin D. Roosevelt to add more justices in 1937.  
 Diversity on the Court has been a concern from the beginning. President George 
Washington wrote in 1799: “It would be inexpedient to take two of the Associate Judges 
from the same state. The practice has been to disseminate them through the United 
States” (Epstein 58). Geographical diversity has continued to be a goal, but religion and 
ethnicity have also become valid concerns. Roger B. Taney, who was confirmed as Chief 
Justice in 1836, was the first Catholic on the Court. The next Catholic was not appointed 
until 1894 (Ibid. 58). In 1916, Louis Brandeis was the first Jew to be appointed, and there 
was a “Jewish seat” until 1969, when Abe Fortas resigned. Thurgood Marshall was the 
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first African-American to serve on the court, and when he retired in 1991, President 
George H. W. Bush appointed another African-American, Clarence Thomas, to succeed 
him. Sandra Day O’Connor, appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, was the first 
woman on the Supreme Court. When she retired in 2005, George W. Bush was under 
pressure to nominate a woman, and even his own wife argued for it (Nemacheck 50). He 
nominated Harriet Miers, but when her nomination failed, he chose Samuel Alito. Alito is 
the 5th Catholic on the current court, marking a clear shift from the Protestant-dominated 
court in the first 200 years. 
Louis Brandeis’ nomination in 1916 was the first in which the Senate conducted 
hearings. Brandeis was Jewish and a well known liberal activist at the time, and 
Republicans in the Senate created a subcommittee to investigate whether he was fit to 
serve on the Court (Parry-Giles 28). Brandeis did not appear to testify himself, but the 
politicizing of his nomination, the news media attention, and the underlying issue of his 
religious and ethnic affiliation ensured increased attention in future nominations. There 
were thorough Senate debates on most of the following nominations. The first time the 
Senate Judiciary Committee conducted hearings on a nominee was when Harlan Fisk 
Stone was nominated by Calvin Coolidge in 1925. Stone testified before the committee 
and with only a few exceptions, this has been the practice since (Nemacheck 93).  
Through the 20th century, the Supreme Court gradually took a more active role in 
American society. During the presidency of Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1933 
to 1945, the Court changed its views drastically. It allowed the federal government to 
grow and seize more power from the states. After Roosevelt began his New Deal 
legislation, the Court ruled that several parts of it were unconstitutional. Roosevelt 
threatened to introduce legislation to add one more justice to the court for each sitting 
justice above age 70, trying to change the majority’s view. Congress also introduced 
legislation to let justices over 70 with 10 years of experience retire with full salary 
(O’Brien 348). The “court-packing plan” was very unpopular, but eventually several 
justices chose to retire and from 1937 it changed its views fundamentally. One of many 
examples of the switch was the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It put quotas on production 
to stabilize the agricultural market, and had been ruled unconstitutional in 1936 as it 
intruded on states’ rights. But in 1938, Congress introduced a new and even more 
 13 
comprehensive Agricultural Adjustment Act, and in 1942 the Court found it 
constitutional in Wickard v. Filburn (Chen 121). This allowed the federal government to 
impose detailed regulation of what and how much one farmer could produce. The rational 
was founded on an expanded view of Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution which 
allows Congress to regulate commerce “among the several states.” 
 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s court-packing attempt marked a change in the role of the 
Supreme Court in American Society. Roosevelt’s far-reaching reforms could not have 
been put into place without the support of the Court. The New Deal policies allowed the 
federal government to increase its size and reach. Big federal programs like the 
depression-era efforts to put people to work on a federal payroll were put in place by 
Roosevelt. Social Security was also introduced, marking a huge undertaking of social 
programs by the federal government. By allowing increased federal powers and more 
regulation, the Court injected itself into the public debate in a new role. 
Earl Warren was appointed Chief Justice by President Dwight Eisenhower in 
1953. During his tenure, which lasted until 1969, the Court took on several civil rights 
issues and defied the concept of “states’ rights” which was often used as an excuse to 
discriminate against minorities. The earlier practice had been based on the 10th 
Amendment’s which says that “powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people” (US Constitution). The Court ordered desegregation of public schools in 
1954, and in 1966 it established the famous Miranda warning by which people are 
informed of their rights to remain silent and to receive counsel when apprehended by 
police. The Court pursued a progressive agenda and gave criminals more rights and 
ensured that the one-man-one-vote principle was applied to state legislative districts 
(Abraham 257). The 14th Amendment, originally passed after the Civil War, was now 
being actively used in a wide variety of cases to force individual states to ensure “equal 
representation.”  
Warren’s activism was unexpected since he had been a moderate Republican 
governor of California. President Eisenhower, a Republican, had expected him to be 
more restrained and was disappointed by the activist direction the Court had taken. He 
once called the Warren appointment “the biggest damn-fooled mistake” (sic) he had ever 
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made (O’Brien 69). There were also conservatives who argued for impeachment of 
Warren, and although unsuccessful, it shows the amount of controversy the Court 
created. Although Eisenhower expressed regret about that appointment, he also appointed 
William Brennan, who would become a liberal authority on the Court for more than thirty 
years. Eisenhower paid less attention to the ideologies of his candidates than to practical 
political concerns. This would change with later Republican presidents. The Court 
continued to be controversial into the 1970s, and Roe v. Wade, the controversial decision 
that prohibited states from outlawing abortion, was announced in 1973 and is still a very 
important part of the national debate. 
 President Lyndon B. Johnson, a Democrat, announced Earl Warren’s retirement 
on June 26, 1968.  He also announced that he would promote Associate Justice Abe 
Fortas, a friend and advisor, to Chief Justice. This was only five months before the 
election, and the Republicans in the Senate put up a fight. There was a lot to win for 
them. Republicans thought they would be able to delay the nomination until after the 
presidential election, and they would be able to pander to their conservative 
constituencies which could help them in the election. For the first time, the filibuster 
technique was used against a judicial nominee (Epstein 24). A filibuster prevents the 
Senate debate on a certain matter from being closed, which makes it impossible to vote 
on the issue. The necessary amount of votes required to break a filibuster is 60 which 
means that 41 votes are needed to filibuster in the Senate. During the Fortas nomination it 
was only 34, since cloture required a two-thirds majority back then. Fortas eventually 
withdrew his name, and Warren stayed on the Court for another year. The filibuster was 
rarely used again for judicial nominations until the Democrats used it to block some of 
George W. Bush’s lower court nominees. However, during Bill Clinton’s presidency, the 
Republicans in the Senate had used the tactic of delaying hearings indefinitely on his 
lower court nominees which produced the exact same result of hindering their 
appointments. 
 Earl Warren presumably wanted his successor to continue his liberal legacy on the 
Court. His retirement came too late in the embattled Johnson’s term for that to be 
possible. When Warren finally retired in 1969, Richard Nixon had become president and 
was able to name Warren’s successor. In addition, Abe Fortas had become burdened with 
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questions regarding his acceptance of money from powerful donors. He resigned in 1969, 
and Nixon, who had just taken the oath of office, was able to replace two of the liberal 
members of the Warren Court. This marked the gradual ending of the activist Warren era. 
Republican presidents, beginning with Nixon, had a clear idea of the kind of justices they 
wanted on the Court.  
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3. Richard Nixon 
 
The controversies surrounding Richard Nixon’s nominations were a sign of things to 
come. Nixon named a total of six nominees, of which two were rejected. At the beginning 
of his presidency, Nixon made it publicly known that he wanted justices with a “strict 
constructionist” judicial philosophy on the Court (Abraham 18). Justice Rehnquist, who 
would become Chief Justice during Reagan’s presidency, is considered to have followed 
that ideology. Nixon’s two failed nominees, Clement F. Haynsworth and G. Harrold 
Carswell, were also considered very conservative. The record is more complicated for 
Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger, Justice Lewis Powell, and Justice Harry Blackmun. 
What was new about Nixon was his public advocacy of a very conservative judicial 
philosophy and the behind-the-scenes work of his aides to promote candidates and even 
bring down sitting justices. 
Nixon was elected President in 1968, after a period of racial riots, assassinations, 
and anti-war protests. His pursued a “Southern strategy” which played on the skepticism 
toward the radical movements at the time. The strategy was designed to bring 
Southerners, especially white, conservative Democrats in the South into the Republican 
Party. He used his first Supreme Court nominations to appease these groups, saying that 
he would appoint a Justice “who would see himself as a ‘caretaker’ of the Constitution 
and not as a ‘super-legislator’ with a free hand to impose … social and political view 
points upon the American people” (Abraham 14). This statement referred to the activism 
of the Warren Court, which was widely unpopular in the South, in addition to playing on 
people’s insecurities during a turbulent period in America’s history. His usage of terms 
like “law and order” was likely an attempt to criticize the radical movements at the time. 
Nixon wanted a “strict constructionist,” which has since been the preferred ideal for 
conservative activists. But he also learned that while his nominees might have been 
popular with his conservative constituencies, some of them would not be acceptable to 
the Senate and the public. 
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3.1 Warren Earl Burger – Chief Justice (1969) 
After the long and eventful reign of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the tenure of his 
replacement Warren E. Burger would be slightly less eventful in the legal sense, but still 
controversial. Nixon had inherited the Chief Justice nomination from Lyndon B. Johnson, 
who failed to replace Earl Warren with Justice Abe Fortas before Nixon took over. The 
Fortas Chief Justice nomination failed in October 1968, and Nixon had had ample time to 
consider candidates. The first nomination was important as a way of showing leadership 
and conservative merit. According to Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward, who 
detailed the first years of Burger’s tenure in The Brethren, Nixon wanted “someone 
whose views were fully predictable, not a crony or political friend, someone with 
integrity and administrative ability. Someone young enough to serve at least ten years” 
(Woodward 19). Nixon was aware of the Chief’s influence, and his statements reflect that 
he wanted someone who could stay in that position long enough to influence the Court 
significantly. 
In February 1969, just two weeks after Nixon’s inauguration, Warren Earl Burger 
was invited to a swearing-in ceremony of a government official at the White House. 
Burger was an associate judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, where he often 
wrote spirited dissents attacking the liberal majority (Woodward 6).  After the ceremony, 
Nixon invited him to the Oval Office, where he praised Burger for his judicial views. 
They talked about the need for reigning in the judiciary and the meeting lasted for more 
than an hour. Nixon wanted Burger to supply him with recommendations for judicial 
nominations, which Burger was happy to do. Nixon and Burger had met before, the first 
time in 1948 when they both were working on Republican campaigns (Woodward 6). 
Burger had made a good impression on Nixon, and he was invited to a dinner to honor 
outgoing Chief Justice Earl Warren on April 23. Burger was the only lower court judge 
there, which added to the media speculation about a possible nomination. 
Justice Potter Stewart, an appointee of President Eisenhower, was considered the 
frontrunner for the Chief Justice position. Stewart was widely respected, relatively young 
at 54, and was considered a conservative (Woodward 11). On April 30, he asked for a 
meeting with the President. He had given a lot of thought to a possible nomination, and 
had decided against being considered for Chief Justice. Nixon brought up the subject, and 
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Stewart quickly responded that he had decided against it. He was worried about his own 
privacy, he did not want his life to be scrutinized, nor for his family to be put through the 
process. He was also aware of the past problems and internal conflicts on the Court that 
had arisen from promoting a sitting Justice. 
Nixon instructed his Attorney General John Mitchell to look into the affairs of 
several liberal Justices for possible embarrassing stories or conflicts of interest 
(Woodward 14). William O. Douglas, William Brennan, and Abe Fortas were targeted. In 
early May 1969 it was disclosed in a Life Magazine article that Justice Fortas had 
received a $20,000 fee from a foundation run buy a friend who was investigated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and later convicted. Mitchell had provided material 
for the article, and Nixon thought this was a good opportunity to alter the balance of the 
court by pressuring a justice to resign (Woodward 15). Fortas eventually submitted a 
resignation letter on May 14, and Nixon now had the opportunity to appoint two justices, 
replacing liberals Warren and Fortas. Justice Brennan eventually withdrew all his public 
speaking engagements, memberships and investments to avoid further trouble after some 
critical articles in the news media (Woodward 17).  
Burger’s nomination was announced on May 21, at the end of Warren’s last term 
on the Court (Greenhouse, “Burger”). Nixon had been very careful in keeping the 
nomination a secret, as he was eager to “beat” the press in making a surprise 
announcement (Woodward 19). Burger had been offered the job two days earlier, and 
Mitchell had run the FBI background check two days before that. Burger was smuggled 
into the White House before the announcement. The Burger nomination was very well 
received by southern Senators and leaders, which might have encouraged Nixon to find 
an even more conservative candidate for his next nomination (Hoff 46).  
Although Democrats had the majority in the Senate, they realized that their 
influence was limited. The 1968 election of Nixon was a backlash against the liberalism 
that had been championed by Democratic presidents from FDR to Johnson. The Warren 
Court’s activism had been controversial, and Democrats understood that a relatively 
qualified conservative nominee from Nixon would be very hard to stop.  
Nixon had established the Office of Communications as a part of the White 
House, and it served as a public relations instrument. The Office engaged direct mail 
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services to distribute 30,000 fact sheets about Burger to local newspapers across the 
country (Maltese 129). They also had people sending letters to the editor to newspapers 
favoring the nomination. Nixon knew he might not be supported by the larger 
newspapers, but his Office of Communications and the direct mail outreach to local news 
media were early signs of what would become a very good campaign apparatus for 
conservatives in the future. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings were uneventful. Burger’s testimony 
lasted for only two hours, and Senator Edward Kennedy, one of the most prominent 
liberals on the committee, did not even ask any questions of him (Woodward 22). 
Burger’s service was commended by senators of both parties. Southern Democrat Robert 
Byrd, who only five years earlier had personally filibustered the Civil Rights Act, praised 
Burger for his focus on law and order (Silverstein 131). The committee recommended 
him unanimously. The final Senate vote came down 74-3 in favor of his confirmation on 
June 9, only 19 days after the nomination. 
Although the Court took a turn toward the right after the Burger appointment, it 
did not become distinctively conservative. There were several liberal victories and 
controversial decisions, like Roe v. Wade in 1973. Burger had a leadership style that was 
often unpopular with his fellow Justices, and in Bob Woodward’s 1979 book The 
Brethren, Burger came across as someone who would change his vote to be able assign 
himself or a conservative to write an important decision. This way he could make sure 
that the majority opinion was not excessively liberal and could avoid what he considered 
dangerous precedents that could lead to more liberal decisions. Woodward also describes 
how Burger would surprise his colleagues with “niggling and arbitrary” changes in 
opinions that were hard to decipher even in an ideological light (Woodward 436). Several 
clerks and justices shared their frustrations with Woodward, which led to much 
controversy when the book was released. Burger’s tenure is not considered to have made 
the Court as conservative as he probably would have liked. He stayed conservative 
throughout his tenure, but he was also a realist who sometimes switched to the majority 
with the intention of compromise when he saw what the vote count was. Some examples 
of his centrist achievements are Roe v. Wade, and United States v. Nixon. In the latter, the 
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Court forced Nixon to turn over the White House tapes, which eventually resulted in his 
resignation from the presidency. 
  
3.2 Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. (1969) 
On August 18, 1969, Nixon nominated Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. to fill the seat that 
Abe Fortas had left open. The nomination was a continuation of Nixon’s “Southern 
Strategy.” Haynsworth was from South Carolina and a judge on the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.  
Although Haynsworth’s philosophy was conservative and broke with the direction 
of the Warren Court, the nomination was initially perceived to be safe, because of support 
from some southern Democrats and the presence of no big scandals. But the Democrats 
had recovered from the blows of the Fortas resignation and the Warren retirement and 
intended to put up a fight (Woodward 63). The memory of how Republicans had delayed 
the Fortas nomination the year before and effectively turned the Chief Justice nomination 
over to Nixon further motivated them. The Democrats had a majority in both houses of 
Congress. Civil rights groups and labor unions quickly voiced their opposition to the 
nomination (Maltese 72). Haynsworth had ruled against several laws aimed to protect 
minorities and workers, including desegregation (Epstein 95).  
Senate Republican leader Everett Dirksen’s death in September 1969 delayed the 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings and gave Democrats extra time to prepare (Maltese 
73). During the hearings, it was revealed that Haynsworth while a judge on lower courts 
had ruled in several cases where he had financial interests. Although experts who testified 
said it did not represent a major conflict of interest, it became very difficult to let it pass, 
considering that he was replacing Fortas who had received very strict scrutiny. 
Haynsworth was a shy man, and during the hearings he some times stuttered and 
appeared evasive (Maltese 74). Considering the charges against him, this did not help 
him. Haynsworth was asked whether he agreed with the direction of the Warren Court, 
but would not address a general question like that, and was skeptical to enter into 
discussion with Senator Kennedy about the reasons why there was disillusionment and 
unrest among many young people at the time (Haynsworth hearings 76, 79). One of the 
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most prominent Democratic critics was Senator Birch Bayh. The White House had 
helped a newspaper prepare conflict of interest charges against Bayh because of union 
contributions to his campaign (Maltese 79). The article was conveniently published 
before the Senate vote but it did not change the outcome. Eleven organizations were 
called to testify in the hearings, more than for any other nominee up to that point 
(Maltese 90). On November 21, the Senate voted Haynsworth down by 55 to 45 votes. 
Several prominent Republicans voted against him, which infuriated Nixon (Maltese 73).  
Nixon aide John Erlichman blamed the defeat on a “highly expert, expensive and 
intensive lobbying campaign by organized labor and civil rights groups” (Epstein 95). 
However, there was a detailed strategy in promoting Haynsworth as well. Nixon and the 
White House launched a letter writing campaign where local Republican chairmen 
pressured their senators, as well as working closely with “friendly” newspapers to make 
sure that opponents were labeled as anti-South (Maltese 78). Nixon also pushed senators 
to promote the nomination, with limited success. Republican John J. Williams of 
Delaware voted against Haynsworth after the “strong-arm” tactics was used against him. 
He had received a visit by Attorney General Mitchell who only pushed the argument of 
ideology and not qualifications, and that had put Williams off (Maltese 79). Republican 
Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska eagerly used the arguments that the White House 
provided him with in the Senate and on television appearances, but he was one of very 
few senators who were willing to be publicly supportive of the nominee (Maltese 80). 
Nixon considered the rejection completely unwarranted (Hoff 46). After the easy 
confirmation of Burger, who was considered highly respected, Nixon might have been 
justified in expecting Haynsworth to be confirmed. The unlucky combination of his 
financial dealings and his somewhat controversial record on the bench sank the 
nomination. In retrospect, it can be argued that the nomination was not as well prepared 
as the Burger nomination, and according to Nixon biographer Joan Hoff, Nixon 
disengaged himself from the nomination of Haynsworth and let his most conservative 
aides oversee the vetting process (Hoff 46). Nixon was, however, very much involved in 
the promotion process.  
Haynsworth continued to serve on the circuit court and was a reliable conservative 
vote there. Since his qualifications were never considered severely lacking, it left open 
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the opportunity for Republicans to paint the rejection as partisan. Nixon immediately 
wrote a memo on how to punish the senators who voted against Haynsworth by holding 
back information normally provided by the White House to senators (Maltese 83). He 
was not planning to let the rejection stop his agenda.  
 
3.3 G. Harrold Carswell (1970) 
Nixon moved quickly with the next nomination. On January 19 1970, G. Harrold 
Carswell was presented as the nominee. Carswell was a Floridian who had just been 
confirmed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Since Carswell was a conservative 
Southerner, the nomination was intended to send a signal that Nixon would not back 
down from his southern strategy. 
 The nomination was rushed by Nixon’s demand for a quick announcement of 
another Southerner. White House advisors Charles Colson and Egil “Bud” Krogh 
confirmed that they were taken by surprise by the announcement, and that they only 
finished checking Carswell’s background after the announcement (Maltese 14). A few 
days after the nomination, a Florida newspaper ran an article about something that neither 
the White House nor the Justice Department had been able to find out. In 1948, as a 
candidate for a seat in the Georgia legislature, Carswell had given a speech where he had 
announced: “I yield to no man as a fellow candidate, or as a fellow citizen, in the firm, 
vigorous belief in the principles of white supremacy, and I shall always be so governed.” 
His record as a judge confirmed that he consistently ruled against minorities (Maltese 
15).  
Several Nixon advisors realized that Carswell had been a mistake, and saw the 
possible damage that a new failed nomination could cause. Adding to this, it came to 
light that Carswell’s opinions were of mediocre quality, and that his qualifications could 
be questioned to a larger degree than those of Haynsworth. Nixon discussed a tactic of 
pointing to how senators who opposed Carswell had failed exams, but was advised that 
senators would not level such attacks against each other (Maltese 16). Senator Hruska 
was encouraged to speak out for Carswell, and in doing so committed one of the most 
famous gaffes in recent Supreme Court nominations. In an interview he responded: 
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“Even if he is mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They 
are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they?”  
Colson came up with the idea of letting Nixon publicly stand firm on the 
executive power to appoint judges. He arranged that Nixon would answer an inquiring 
Senator to make it appear as advice rather than an announcement. Against the advice of 
several advisors, they found a willing senator, William Saxbe of Ohio, and Colson crafted 
a letter from Nixon where he warned against the Senate interfering with his powers to 
appoint. The letter was not well received by senators because it could be interpreted to 
question the “advice and consent” that is believed to justify an appointment as a shared 
responsibility between the president and the Senate (Maltese 12). The White House 
Office of Communications continued its letter-writing strategy to newspapers around the 
country, but this time it was hard to turn around the public impression of Carswell 
(Maltese 130). 
During the Senate hearings, Nixon’s pressuring of Republican senators proved to 
have some effect. Republican Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania supported Carswell 
and was, according to Democratic Senator Paul Simon, “eager to show his GOP 
credentials” after voting down Haynsworth (Simon 292). Clarence Mitchell testified for 
the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) and stated 
bluntly that the Senate would be voting on whether to “ratify racism” (Simon 292). 
Professor John Lowenthal of Rutgers Law School testified on Carswell’s attempts to 
hinder cases against voter suppression while on a federal district court in Tallahassee, 
Florida (Carswell hearings, 140). Carswell’s own testimony was rather uneventful. He 
claimed not to have attended an all-white country club that he was a member of in the 
1960s, and he distanced himself from some decisions that appeared negative toward 
minorities and women by saying he could not re-argue those cases before the Senate, and 
that he deferred to the Constitution (Ibid. 41). 
The Senate vote was held on April 8, rejecting him 51-45. Although it was closer 
than the Haynsworth nomination, the White House had much earlier in the process 
realized it would be difficult. Nixon was again angry, and his counsel John Dean stated 
that Nixon considered a quick nomination of Democratic Senator Robert Byrd, who was 
anti-civil rights at the time, just out of spite (Epstein 135).  
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Only 5 days after the Carswell defeat Republican House Minority Leader Gerald 
Ford, who had been supplied with unconfirmed information from Attorney General 
Mitchell, argued for impeachment of liberal Justice William O. Douglas (Woodward 87). 
This was part of Nixon’s revenge, but it had little chance of success because of 
Democratic majorities in both houses. The information about Douglas’ statements and 
involvements might have been controversial, but it was neither unexpected nor damning 
from a professed liberal like him.  
Nixon later admitted that Carswell was nominated out of anger because of 
Haynsworth’s defeat (Hoff 46). Dean also blamed the failure of the hurried nomination 
and the inability of FBI to uncover both the racist remarks and Carswell’s affairs with 
men while he was married (Epstein 71). The latter did not come up during the 
nomination, but both facts would probably have caused Nixon not to nominate Carswell 
had they been known.  
 
3.4 Harry A. Blackmun (1970) 
On April 9, 1970, the day after the Carswell defeat, Nixon stated: “I will not nominate 
another Southerner and let him be subjected to the kind of malicious character 
assassination accorded both Judges Haynsworth and Carswell” (Woodward 87).  It had 
been 11 months since Fortas resigned, and the seat was still open. On the Supreme Court, 
the justices had put aside many cert petitions that had 3 votes and cases where the 
conference vote had been 4-4, awaiting a ninth justice. There was a real need to fill the 
last seat. Nixon had realized that he would be unable to appoint a conservative 
Southerner, and while trying to make a point about his efforts to score points with 
Southerners for the upcoming midterm elections, he had begun searching for another 
nominee. 
 Harry A. Blackmun, a judge on the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, was contacted 
by Attorney General Mitchell the morning after Carswell’s defeat and told to come to 
Washington (Woodward 100). Blackmun had grown up in Minnesota and was a 
childhood friend of Chief Justice Burger. Nixon saw no problem in that fact, and most 
likely he thought it an advantage considering the conversations he used to have with the 
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Chief, who had recommended Blackmun (Woodward 101). Mitchell’s staff, headed by 
Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist, questioned Blackmun on his past, his 
associations and his earlier decisions. They found that he had held stock in companies 
that were indirectly affected by his rulings, but did not consider it problematic. Nixon sat 
down with Blackmun, something he had not done with Haynsworth and Carswell. He 
liked Blackmun’s “levelheaded strict-constructionist philosophy” and considered him 
modest and predictable (Woodward 101). He also asked about his family, and Blackmun 
assured Nixon that his daughters were not “hippie types.” 
 The closes thing to a scandal was an interview Nina Totenberg of the National 
Observer did with Blackmun’s 85-year old mother. Blackmun’s mother confided how 
Burger and Blackmun talked to each other every week on the phone. Although Blackmun 
was “enraged” at the revelation, it had little effect on his nomination (Woodward 102). 
The Senate hearings went without incident. Some Southern senators pointed out that 
Blackmun’s financial involvements were similar to Haynsworth’s, but Blackmun was 
confirmed easily by a vote of 94-0 on May 12, 1970 (Woodward 102).   
 Blackmun’s easy confirmation was to a large degree the result of Nixon catering 
to the Senate’s will. Its rejection of his first two nominees had sent a strong signal that 
conservative Southerners were not acceptable, and although Nixon was resilient and 
stubborn, he had to give in at last.  
Blackmun started out as a conservative vote, but after a couple of years on the 
Court he began moving toward the left, and took increasingly critical stances toward the 
death penalty, and increasingly favored women’s and minorities’ rights. Blackmun is 
remembered mainly for his majority opinion in Roe v. Wade which prohibited states from 
outlawing abortions, and for his announcement toward the end of his career in a dissent to 
refusing cert in Callins v. Collins that he would “no longer tinker with the machinery of 
death” (Callins v. Collins). Blackmun was thorough and conscious in his research and 
Woodward even describes how he agonized over details. He spent longer time on writing 
opinions than his colleagues. This led to some frustration on the Court, but his thorough 
research also gave him authority on facts, which helped convince other justices in Roe v. 
Wade. 
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Nixon, who initially seemed favorable to Blackmun, had been unable to predict 
the turnaround. Considering that Blackmun replaced the liberal Fortas, the Court was 
only tilted slightly toward the conservative side by Blackmun, at least after he the 
stopped consistently siding with the conservatives after the first couple of years. The 
major reason for Blackmun’s appointment was that Nixon, although firm about the kind 
of justices he wanted, was unable to get them confirmed and had to settle on a candidate 
that appeared more moderate.  
 
3.5 Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (1971) 
During the summer of 1971, justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan became 
gravely ill. They both retired in September, within a week of one another, Black on 17 
September and Harlan on 23 September. Neither Black nor Harlan can be viewed as 
extremely liberal or conservative. They had been appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Dwight Eisenhower. Both had held an adherence to textual interpretation of the 
Constitution, although neither could be labeled as strict constructionists by today’s 
standards. Black had originally been a supporter of Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms, but 
grown more careful and conservative over time.  
Nixon, who now had two vacancies to fill, immediately began circulating names, 
and even purposely leaking information to measure what kind of candidates he would be 
able to get through. This time the justices he was replacing were more conservative than 
Fortas and Warren, and more than a year had passed since the battles over Haynsworth 
and Carswell. Nixon first sent the name of conservative Republican Congressman 
Richard Poff from Virginia to the American Bar Association committee for a rating. Poff 
quickly withdrew his name when it appeared he would not get a favorable rating 
(Woodward 190). Then Nixon leaked Senator Byrd’s name, and as expected, it created 
uproar in Washington. Two more names followed quickly, Mildred Lillie and Herschel 
Friday. These were both interviewed by Mitchell and Rehnquist, who concluded that they 
were not experienced enough and not likely to perform well at the hearings. Nixon’s 
reasons for nominating them were likely to be that Lillie could make history as the first 
woman on the Court, and that Friday was an Alabaman, and Nixon had not given up on 
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getting another Southerner appointed. According to Woodward, most of the justices on 
the Court were very skeptical about the names that were floated in the media.  
Chief Justice Burger was worried about the reputation of the Court if even more 
unqualified persons were nominated, and he contacted Mitchell with some suggestions, 
among them Lewis Powell (Woodward 192). Lewis Powell was a former president of the 
A.B.A. and a highly respected private attorney. He came from a distinguished Virginia 
family but had gained great respect for his moderate attitude and leadership skills on 
several legal organizations and corporations (Greenhouse, “Powell”). On October 18, 
Nixon received an indication from the A.B.A. that they were not likely to rate Lillie or 
Friday well, and the next day he told Mitchell to offer Powell the job. Powell, who was 
64, had been considered when Carswell was rejected, and he had decided not to accept an 
offer. He first declined Mitchell’s offer twice; then Nixon called him later in the day and 
said he had a “duty to the South, the Court, the President and the Country” (Woodward 
193). Powell was not able to turn down the President’s request. Nixon had settled on 
Rehnquist for the other seat. 
On October 21, Nixon scheduled a televised address where he announced two 
nominations; Powell for Black’s seat, and Rehnquist for Harlan’s seat. The handling of 
the announcement was similar to the very successful Burger announcement, and Nixon 
made headlines again with two nominees he appeared to be very happy with.  
Powell received the highest rating from the A.B.A. and had no trouble in the 
Senate. The Judiciary Committee chairman, conservative Democrat James Eastland, told 
Powell bluntly that he was going to be confirmed regardless because the senators thought 
he was “going to die” soon (Woodward 194). His age made him less controversial as he 
was not expected to influence the Court for as long as a younger candidate would. 
Powell’s moderate record, having worked to provide legal help to low income people, 
helped him compared to Rehnquist, the more conservative nominee.  
The hearings were mostly focused on his stock holdings, his views on the Warren 
Court and on executive privilege and surveillance. Powell was praised for his 
achievements, and there was little controversy compared to what Rehnquist would be 
asked about. Conservative senators asked him about statements that were perceived to 
praise the Warren Court, and Powell moderated himself by saying that he did not agree 
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with everything, but still had a high respect for the Court’s decisions (Powell and 
Rehnquist hearings, 258). The Senate Judiciary Committee reported Powell to the Senate 
by a favorable 16-0 vote, which was quite unusual at the time. The final Senate vote on 
December 6 was 89-1. 
Powell continued his moderate record on the Court and was considered a centrist 
until he retired in 1987. He sided with conservatives in many cases regarding criminal 
law. But he joined the majority in Roe v. Wade and related it to an experience where he 
early in his career was asked for help by a co-worker whose girlfriend had died trying to 
abort her pregnancy. He later expressed regret for his vote in Bowers v. Hardwick where 
he in a 5-4 decision in 1986 had voted to uphold a Georgia law against homosexual 
conduct. While voting in favor of the death penalty on the Court, he in 1991 told a 
biographer that he now thought the death penalty should be abolished (Greenhouse, 
“Powell”). Powell probably turned out to be more moderate than Nixon expected from a 
Southerner, but Rehnquist would be more in line with Nixon’s judicial philosophy. 
 
3.6 William H. Rehnquist (1971) 
Rehnquist was the more conservative of the two nominees by a good margin. In his job as 
Assistant Attorney General, Rehnquist had prepared for a strategy meeting and was 
surprisingly offered the nomination by Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst. 
(Woodward 193). White House counsel John Dean later took the credit, claiming he was 
the first to propose Rehnquist. Rehnquist was also a friend of Kleindienst who he had met 
when he lived in Arizona.  
Rehnquist grew up in a conservative family in Wisconsin. After his service in 
World War II he went on to Stanford and Harvard where he graduated in political 
science. He then entered law school at Stanford and served as a clerk for Justice Robert 
Jackson afterwards. At Stanford he was a classmate of future justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor. He entered private practice in Arizona, and supported the campaigns of Barry 
Goldwater and Richard Nixon in 1964 and 1968. He was offered a job in the Nixon 
administration and moved to Washington in 1969 (Greenhouse, “Rehnquist”).  
 29 
Nixon hoped that the double nomination would help to get both through by 
spreading the focus of the senators. Senator Eastland moved quickly to avoid controversy 
and told the A.B.A. committee that he would subpoena each member to testify about their 
reasons if they did not give Rehnquist their highest rating. By a 9-3 vote, Rehnquist 
received that rating (Woodward 193).  
At the hearings, several segregation cases came back to haunt Rehnquist. In 1952, 
while clerking for Justice Jackson, Rehnquist had written a memo that said “’separate but 
equal’ facilities were all that was constitutionally required” (Ibid. 195). He was also 
questioned about having challenged the voting rights of minorities as an Arizona poll 
watcher (Powell and Rehnquist hearings, 71). Rehnquist had defended Nixon’s views of 
far reaching executive powers and supported mass arrest of protestors (Rosen 188). 
Senator Kennedy pressed Rehnquist about the incident at Kent State University in Ohio 
1970, where anti-war protestors were killed by the National Guard. The Justice 
Department had not turned over FBI investigation files to Congress, claiming executive 
privilege. Rehnquist only answered in general terms, and defended the executive 
privilege as it could be unfair to the parts involved in an ongoing investigation (Powell 
and Rehnquist hearings, 37). He also criticized the Justice Department that Rehnquist was 
part of for spending vast resources on investigating the leak of the Pentagon Papers, 
which included secret information about actions taken in Vietnam War, while not 
prioritizing the Kent State incident.  
The Rehnquist nomination was the first time the American Civil Liberties Union 
formally opposed a nominee (Simon 295). Senator Edward Kennedy was one of the 
strongest liberal voices against the nomination, and he stated that Rehnquist had shown a 
“dangerous hostility” toward minority rights (Rosen 188). Rehnquist was confirmed by a 
68-26 vote on December 10, four days after Powell. 
 Nixon had disliked the way Rehnquist dressed the first time he met him and 
labeled him a “clown” for his “loud shirts” and colored ties. When he heard his name he 
had asked “Is he Jewish? He looks it” (Rosen 188). Rehnquist was highly regarded by the 
other justices for his calm temper and lack of pretentiousness. He would stay very 
conservative throughout his life. His service in the administration and his professed 
conservatism convinced Nixon, and the strategy of a double nomination might have 
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saved Rehnquist from a fate similar to that of Haynsworth and Carswell. Democratic 
Senator John Tunney remarked the following during the hearings:  
 
Mr. Rehnquist, you and I are relatively young men, and, as such, I feel a very important 
responsibility in passing judgment on your qualifications, because it is entirely possible 
that in the year 2000 you will still be sitting on the Supreme Court if you are confirmed. 
(Powell and Rehnquist hearings, 75) 
 
This observation emphasizes the worries that Democrats had as members of the Warren 
Court were gradually retiring and being replaced by more conservative justices. Though 
Rehnquist’s views stayed distinctively conservative throughout his tenure he also showed 
a pragmatic side as he cared a lot about the Court as an institution. Rehnquist was 
promoted to Chief Justice in 1986, and continued to serve until 2005, leaving a long and 
conservative legacy on the Court.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Richard Nixon’s personality both helped and hurt him when it came to his Supreme Court 
nominations. Nixon was a both a hardliner and a pragmatist at times. If we judge his 
appointments by his public statements of what he wanted justices to be like, he would 
probably have been most satisfied with Rehnquist and Burger. These nominations were 
also handled very well by the White House. The Burger nomination and the 
Rehnquist/Powell nominations were well planned and made an effective use of the news 
media when presented at televised press conferences. Rehnquist, who might have faced 
problems in the Senate, probably had an easier time because he was nominated at the 
same time as the well respected and perceived moderate Powell, spreading the attention 
of the Senate and the news media.  
Nixon’s two failed nominees, Haynsworth and Carswell, left him with little 
capital to spend and the Blackmun choice was a direct result of that. He never gave up on 
putting very conservative justices on the Court. The Haynsworth nomination could, as 
Nixon himself argued, be considered a fair attempt at putting a reasonably qualified 
Southern conservative on the Court. Haynsworth was unlucky with the timing and the 
heightened scrutiny because of the Fortas situation that Nixon had himself helped bring 
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about. Carswell was by most commentators considered less qualified and appears to be a 
spite nomination, which Nixon clearly was capable of going through with.  
 Nixon’s legacy on judiciary appointments is important. He began a bold and 
defiant conservative campaign to appoint “strict constructionists” who would appeal to 
the rising conservative movement which former conservative Democrats were merging 
with. Nixon also employed a large team through his White House Office of 
Communications who organized country-wide campaigns of lobbying senators and 
writing letters to editors. Nixon, labeled by many as being vindictive and holding 
grudges, used the Justice Department to conduct research into sitting justices associations 
and financial dealings. The relationship between Nixon and Burger, in which they talked 
about issues before the Court and Burger recommended names for judicial nominations, 
was beneficial to Nixon. Although Burger voted against Nixon in United States v. Nixon, 
which eventually led to Nixon’s resignation, their relationship was helpful for Nixon’s 
agenda as they shared similar goals for the remaking of the judiciary. Nixon’s large 
degree of involvement in the process increased the stakes for future presidents, by 
making it a part of a growing liberal versus conservative conflict, engaging interest 
groups, and bringing judicial politics into campaign rhetoric. 
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4. Gerald Ford 
 
When Richard Nixon resigned in 1974, Vice President Gerald Ford rose to the presidency 
as the first president who had never been elected for either the vice presidency or the 
presidency. The situation was genuinely unique. Nixon’s abuses of power and Ford’s 
lacking public mandate caused him to be careful during his short presidency. His pardon 
of Richard Nixon further damaged his popularity and left him with little political capital 
to spend. The pardon was a difficult decision at the time, but has later been viewed more 
favorably as a means of getting the nation to heal faster after a decade of assassinations, 
corruption, and lack of faith in its leaders. When William O. Douglas resigned from the 
Supreme Court in 1975, Ford lacked a mandate to push for a very conservative candidate. 
 
4.1 John Paul Stevens (1975) 
William O. Douglas, a prominent and outspoken liberal who had been appointed by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939, suffered a stroke on December 31, 1974, when 
celebrating New Year’s in the Bahamas. Douglas had been controversial, both for his 
behavior and temper on and outside the Court. He was considered a very influential 
liberal voice, and one was a steadfast supporter of free speech and environmentalism. But 
to some extent his influence was limited by his personality. He had published books and 
interviews that encouraged young people to revolt against the establishment, and 
published law related articles in erotic magazines (Rosen 169). His dissents could be 
particularly forceful and often alienating. He led a turbulent personal life, with periods of 
binge drinking, long vacations away from Washington, womanizing, and four marriages. 
President Ford who, while in Congress, had argued for Douglas’ impeachment, sent a jet 
to get him back to the US for treatment. Douglas quipped to his wife that he hoped Ford 
would not drop him off in Cuba (Woodward 433). After months in rehabilitation, it 
became clear to the other justices that Douglas was not fit to return, and his colleagues 
tried to convince him in different ways, eventually ignoring him and delaying cases in 
which the preliminary vote was 4-4, hoping for a new justice to decide them. Douglas 
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insisted for a long time that he would be able to do his duties, and he did not resign until 
November 12, 1975.  
 Ford faced a difficult situation. He lacked a mandate, the Democrats had a 
majority in both houses, and the outgoing justice was a very prominent and unabashed 
liberal. The impeachment attempt of Douglas in 1970, encouraged by Nixon, was not 
viewed favorably at the time and now it made it difficult for Ford to break with Douglas’ 
legacy by appointing a staunch conservative. The First Lady wanted him to name a 
woman (Woodward 479). The presidential election was less than one year away, and 
Ford had reason to be worried about the opposition he would face both in the primaries 
and the general election. A prolonged battle over a controversial nominee would likely 
hurt his chances. 
Ford delegated much of the research and vetting to his Attorney General Edward 
Levi. Several names where floated by Levi, including Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development Carla Hills, Republican Senator Robert Griffin, and judges J. Clifford 
Wallace, Robert Bork and, Arlin M. Adams (Woodward 485). They all had several 
problematic aspects. The judges had clearly conservative records, and the politicians 
were perceived to have close ties to Nixon or Ford. Nixon had named Bork acting 
Attorney General after his Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General had both 
resigned when they were asked to fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox during the 
Watergate investigation.  
One name that did not have any partisan attachments was John Paul Stevens. Born 
in 1920, Stevens was a Chicago native, a World War II veteran, and had clerked for 
Justice Wiley Rutledge (McFadden, “Stevens”). He had taught at several universities 
while having his own private practice before he was appointed by Nixon to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1970 (Greene 99). Ford had met Stevens briefly at a reception 
and had gotten a positive impression of him as a modest Midwesterner (Woodward 486). 
Ford phoned Stevens to offer him the job, and announced it in a press conference on 
November 28.  
 The hearings on December 8 and went without incident. Some women’s rights 
groups were concerned about his earlier opinions regarding women’s rights. Questioned 
by Senator Kennedy, Stevens replied: “I think women should have exactly the same 
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rights under the law as men. I think they should have the same economic opportunities. 
But I do not think they should win every case they file” (Stevens hearings, 16). Warren 
Christopher, who would later become Secretary of State under President Clinton, testified 
for the A.B.A., who found that “Judge Stevens is one of the best persons available for 
appointment to the Supreme Court” (Ibid. 21). The Judiciary Committee recommended 
him unanimously, and the Senate confirmed him by a 98-0 vote on December 17, only 
three weeks after his nomination. 
 Stevens continues to serve on the Court as of 2009, and is now the senior Justice. 
At age 89 he is in very good health and maintaining a busy schedule (Rosen, 
“Dissenter”). As Justice Blackmun, he is perceived to have moved toward the left during 
his years on the Court. Another similarity is that both justices late in their careers came to 
the conclusion that the death penalty was unconstitutional under the Eight Amendment. 
In 2008 in a dissent to a decision of the Court not to take the case of Baze v. Rees Stevens 
argued that the Court should consider the constitutionality of the death penalty (Baze v. 
Rees 12). Stevens was long considered independent or moderate, and initially the 
conservatives might have been happy with his appointment considering the circumstances 
Ford faced. In later years, Stevens has been considered a very important part of the liberal 
wing of the Court. Stevens himself claims to be a conservative person and argues that the 
new appointments have moved the Court to the right while he has not changed much 
(Rosen, “Dissenter”). In 2005 Ford praised Stevens for his service and endorsed many of 
his views on the Court, specifically referring to the First Amendment and Steven’s 
support for safeguards in criminal proceedings. Stevens says he was “delighted” to 
receive such praise from the president who appointed him. 
 
4.2 Conclusion 
The circumstances of William Douglas’ retirement and Gerald Ford’s lack of popularity 
and lack of a mandate made the Stevens choice relatively straight-forward. Ford might 
have preferred someone with stronger conservative credentials, but it would have been 
very difficult to nominate someone like Bork to replace Douglas. Ford consulted with 
several senators of both parties, as well as submitting more names to the A.B.A. than 
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Nixon had done (Simon 297). A moderate, respected nominee with a distinguished record 
and no obvious controversies was probably the only choice that could be considered 
politically safe at the time. 
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5. Ronald Reagan 
 
Ronald Reagan’s Supreme Court appointments have had a significant impact on 
American society. Reagan appointed Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and 
Anthony Kennedy, and he promoted William Rehnquist to Chief Justice. O’Connor and 
Kennedy have later been considered centrists on the Court, who have been able to be the 
critical “swing vote” in narrow decisions. Scalia and Rehnquist have been reliable 
conservatives. Before Kennedy was nominated, the Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg 
nominations failed amidst great controversy. They were both considered solid 
conservatives. In much of the Supreme Court literature, Ronald Reagan is considered to 
have been successful in making the judiciary more conservative. Reagan biographer Lou 
Cannon claims that “Reagan won the war to remake the federal judiciary and, to a large 
degree, the high court itself” (Cannon 802).  
Reagan’s predecessor, President Jimmy Carter, had not had the chance to appoint 
any Justices. He had tried to set up a merit-based seniority system for federal judges in 
order to reduce the number of political appointments. Reagan was not ready to continue 
this, and sought to pay more attention to the ideology of appointees. In Battle for Justice, 
Ethan Bronner lays out Reagan’s judicial philosophy by explaining that “[f]rom the day 
Reagan took office in 1981, he and those around him made clear that policies of the two 
last decades toward race, sex, and religion … would change drastically” (Bronner 23).  
The literature on Ronald Reagan has mixed opinions on his level of involvement 
in policy. William K. Muir, Jr., explains how Reagan provided “the speech,” a vision that 
his operatives used as basis for carrying out policy, but he was rarely involved or 
interested in the details (Greenstein: “Leadership” 289). Reagan delegated much of the 
research on judicial nominees to his aides and the Justice Department, but he laid out a 
clear direction and was willing to promote his nominations in the media more than any 
former president (Maltese 115).  
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5.1 Sandra Day O’Connor (1981) 
On July 7, 1981, Ronald Reagan nominated Sandra Day O’ Connor to be the first woman 
Supreme Court Justice in American history. Reagan had promised to nominate a woman 
candidate during the campaign, and he chose to use his first nomination to fulfill that 
promise. O’Connor proved to be one of the most important Justices in the history of the 
modern Supreme Court. She became the “swing vote” in a Court that did not change in 
composition between 1993 and 2005. In The Nine, Jeffrey Toobin makes her the central 
character in his book about the Rehnquist Court. Her pragmatic attitude and her 
perception of “fairness” gained her a lot of admiration, and she largely escaped being 
labeled “liberal” or “conservative.” Her nomination went relatively smoothly, but social 
conservatives showed signs of skepticism toward her credentials. This movement would 
increase its influence over future Republican nominations.  
Justice Potter Stewart informed the Reagan administration before the official 
announcement of his resignation. Lou Cannon claims that Reagan was notified through 
Vice President Bush as early as February 1981 (804), while Christine L. Nemacheck 
writes that the information did not reach Reagan until late April because of the 
assassination attempt on him on March 30, after which Reagan spent two weeks in the 
hospital (Nemacheck 8). Stewart did not officially announce his resignation until June 18, 
so the administration had some time to consider candidates (Abraham 330).  
There was a Republican majority in the Senate, and Reagan enjoyed great 
popularity at the time, after recovering from the assassination attempt. Although he had 
promised to nominate a woman during the campaign, he had not said it would be his first 
nomination. His popularity might have emboldened him to choose a relatively unknown 
woman when his advisers had several well known male conservatives on their lists, 
including later nominees Bork and Scalia (Cannon 804). The nomination might also have 
served to pacify the Senate by signaling that his judicial appointments would be 
moderate. By avoiding controversy this early in his presidency, he could position himself 
for a better relationship with the Senate and the public when the time for another 
appointment would come. It could also help his image with women as he had reelection 
in mind.  
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O’Connor was interviewed by Kenneth Starr, a Justice Department aide at the 
time, and she ensured him she was personally opposed to abortion. She told him she had 
never voted on the issue while she was in the Arizona State Senate, which, according to 
Jeffrey Toobin in The Nine, was either a lie or an omission, since there in fact had been a 
bill where she had voted “to end criminal prohibitions on abortion” (Toobin 40). This 
was not investigated further by the vetting team, something that would change in later 
nominations. Reagan met with O’Connor, and was “charmed” by her according to 
Reagan biographer Lou Cannon (Cannon 805). Reagan valued a personal connection, and 
he was convinced that O’Connor was the right choice. According to columnists Rowland 
Evans and Robert Novak, Reagan received newspaper clippings about the abortion bill in 
the Arizona State Senate and asked the Justice Department to look into it. This was the 
day before the nomination was announced, and Kenneth Starr phoned O’Connor who 
said she could not recall how she voted and that she had never advocated for any side of 
the abortion issue (Evans, “Why”). Starr then prepared a memo with no objections to the 
nomination. 
The nomination was well received by politicians of both parties in her home state 
of Arizona, including Senator Barry Goldwater. Edward Kennedy and women’s rights 
groups considered her the best they could hope for coming from Reagan (Abraham 332). 
Opposition was mostly raised by social conservatives, in particular Jerry Falwell, head of 
the Moral Majority, who used her pro-abortion votes in the state senate against her. 
Conservative activist Richard A. Viguiere, one of the architects behind the conservative 
movement since the 1980s, stated that “[o]urs is a new and somewhat fragile coalition, 
and we have now seen it treated in a casual and irresponsible manner” (Viguiere, 
“President’s”). The White House tried to appease the growing constituency of social 
conservatives by stating that O’Connor had told Reagan that she was “personally 
opposed” to abortion, but would leave it to legislatures to regulate it (Abraham 333). 
Goldwater replied to Falwell’s opposition by stating that “[e]very good Christian ought to 
kick Falwell right in the ass” (Abraham 332).  
The hearings lasted for three days and were largely uncontroversial. O’Connor 
made an effort to appease conservatives by stating her skepticism toward busing as a 
means of achieving integration, as well as abortion, and legislating from the bench. She 
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also spoke in favor of the death penalty (Abraham 333). When pressed about the abortion 
issue by Chairman Strom Thurmond, a Republican, she said that any personal view 
should not influence an outcome. To appease skeptics she stated: “I would like to say that 
my own view in the area of abortion is that I am opposed to it as a matter of birth control 
or otherwise” (O’Connor hearings, 61). The Judiciary committee approved her 
nomination by 17-0 and one ‘present’ vote because of her vagueness on abortion. In the 
full Senate, the vote was 99-0.  
The nomination had largely been a success for Reagan and further boosted his 
image. He had not involved himself to a great degree in the nomination. O’Connor was 
the only candidate Reagan interviewed, and he instantly liked her. Lou Cannon has 
described Reagan as a person who valued a personal connection, and that his aides were 
careful about whom he met with since “Reagan was apt to accept as valid any story, 
statistic, or policy recommendation that squared with his prejudices” (Cannon 181). At 
the point when he met with O’Connor, she was already at the top of the list, but her 
personality and her assurances regarding her policy views did probably convince Reagan 
that she was the right choice. Evans and Novak might to some extent have been correct in 
arguing that Reagan’s “narrow flow of information subject[ed] him to staff manipulation” 
(Evans, “Why”). Though one can only speculate if a record of one pro-abortion vote 
would have convinced Reagan to turn around and not nominate a person he had met with 
and instantly liked, and who also were one of the few women that were seriously 
considered. 
Considering O’Connor’s emergence as a moderate voice on the Court, 
conservatives and most likely Reagan, too, became less enthusiastic about her. O’Connor, 
although always willing to compromise, was also influenced by others on the Court. 
Justice Brennan, a liberal who was an important part of the Warren Court, would push 
her away from the liberal wing (Greenburg 183, 124). But when he left, and Ginsburg 
joined who shared an interest with O’Connor in women’s’ issues, she would be more 
willing to consider the liberal positions. Breyer, a pragmatist like O’Connor, might have 
had a similar effect on her.  
After 1973, Roe v. Wade had been the elephant in the room in most nominations. 
The kind of opposition from social conservatives that O’Connor faced would only 
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increase in later nominations. In 2005, Harriet Miers, a nominee with a very sparse legal 
record similar to O’Connor, was forced to withdraw her nomination because of 
conservative pressure. The growth of the conservative movement and increasing 
skepticism of nominees that were not “true believers” on abortion have made it more 
difficult for candidates like O’Connor. Conservatives have been disappointed by Justices 
like Stevens, Blackmun, O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, who have moved towards the 
center and not been reliable conservative votes. At the time, several commentators noted 
that a man with O’Connor’s resume would probably not have been nominated (Abraham 
335). O’Connor stated in 1983 that she was simply “lucky” to be in the right place at the 
right time (Nemacheck 14).  
 
5.2 William H. Rehnquist – Chief Justice (1986) 
William Rehnquist had been a reliable conservative member of the court since he was 
appointed by Richard Nixon. As Chief Justice he left a conservative, but in many regards 
also moderate Court at his death in 2005. His main obstacle to making his conservative 
judicial philosophy the law was the “swing vote,” his old friend Sandra Day O’Connor. 
They both had homes in Arizona, and they knew each other from Stanford University in 
the 1950s (Toobin 252). Rehnquist had been vocal and unashamed of his conservative 
views as an Associate Justice, which was a concern when he was promoted to Chief 
Justice.  
Warren Earl Burger notified Reagan of his retirement as Chief Justice on May 26, 
1986. He had prepared a list of candidates for promotion to Chief and for Associate 
Justice, respectively. The first list most notably featured Justices William Rehnquist and 
Byron White, and the former mentioned Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia (Nemacheck 
85). Reagan’s team added several names to the list, including Justice O’ Connor and 
Anthony Kennedy. The Justice Department had awaited retirements, and had been 
reviewing possible candidates for several years (Nemacheck 86). Reagan had won 
reelection by a landslide in 1984, and with a Republican majority in the Senate, and his 
long time adviser Ed Meese as the new Attorney General, judicial policies were given 
more attention (Toobin 18). On June 9, news of the retirement had still not leaked, and 
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Reagan met with Meese, the White House Chief of Staff Don Regan, and White House 
Counsel Peter Wallison. They had narrowed the list down to 3 candidates – Rehnquist, 
Bork and Scalia – of which Reagan decided on Rehnquist and Scalia, whose nominations 
were announced on June 17 (Nemacheck 86). 
The process had been streamlined and professional, and the administration had 
been able to vet potential candidates well and ended up with alternatives that were all 
distinctly conservative. Scalia was the first Italian-American nominated to the Court, and 
it is likely that this was considered a benefit. Mark Silverstein argues that the nomination 
of the conservative Rehnquist for Chief Justice was expected to meet resistance from 
Democrats, but not enough to ruin the nomination. This would allow Scalia to be 
confirmed more easily than otherwise expected (Silverstein 151).  
In the Judiciary Committee hearings, Rehnquist was questioned about his political 
philosophy, but not much of the criticism would stick. The issues that were brought up 
during his nomination hearings for Associate Justice were revisited but failed to create 
any controversy. He was challenged on decisions in lower courts in Arizona before he 
became a Justice, but would claim he did not remember and generally avoided answering 
specifics. Senator Edward Kennedy pushed about stories of Rehnquist’s resistance to 
civil rights legislation and desegregation, but Rehnquist would only recognize that he had 
at one time opposed desegregation public accommodations (Rehnquist CJ hearings, 150). 
Senator Paul Simon, a Democrat, writes in Advice and Consent that he was skeptical of 
the most conservative member of the Court becoming “the symbol of justice for the 
nation” (Simon 48). The committee finally sent him to the full Senate with a vote of 13-5; 
the minority votes were all cast by Democrats. The final Senate vote was 65-33, the most 
votes cast against a Chief Justice nominee in the 20th century (Cannon 805).  
The strategy had worked out: Democrats would resist Rehnquist, but were not 
able to pin him down in the hearings. They had spent their capital, and the Scalia hearings 
a few days later would be quick and uncontroversial. Although Burger was a 
conservative, the new Chief Justice was even more unabashedly so, and the Reagan team 
could be satisfied with the result.  
Rehnquist received much praise for his tenure as Chief Justice. It is hard to predict 
how a person will function in the leader role, but Rehnquist’s strict but fair and consistent 
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leadership style made him an efficient leader (Rosen 193). Several justices, including 
Rehnquist, had been unhappy with Burger’s leadership. Rehnquist ran the conferences by 
strict rules and distributed important and unimportant case assignments evenly among the 
justices to avoid conflict (Toobin 30). He also worked to reduce the number of cases the 
Court would take.  
Rehnquist took the Court in a conservative direction, but he failed to satisfy social 
conservatives. According to Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist later in his career moderated his 
“ideological passions” and instead focused his attention on preserving the institution of 
the Supreme Court (Rosen 193). Some major issues were decided against Rehnquist’s 
will – gay rights, the death penalty, and cases regarding the war on terror (Toobin 237). 
Jeffrey Toobin claims this fact led Rehnquist to be disillusioned with his failure to 
promote a conservative ideology, and that he instead focused on preserving the 
institution, like his advocacy for renovating the Supreme Court building (Toobin 337). 
Jeffrey Rosen points to how Rehnquist during his tenure sided more often with O’Connor 
than Scalia (Rosen 206). But although unsuccessful on “hot” issues, Rehnquist’s term as 
Chief Justice still saw a very conservative direction on matters of federalism. With Scalia 
and Kennedy on the Court, and later Thomas, Rehnquist was able to get conservative 
victories in limiting the influence of the federal government (Moen, “Federalism” 76). 
This would to some degree reduce the effects of gun control legislation, affirmative 
action, and availability of abortion, and was a significant achievement for Rehnquist. 
 
5.3 Antonin Scalia (1986) 
Antonin Scalia has been one of the most outspoken and colorful members of the Court in 
recent years. He has also been a reliable conservative vote and a self-proclaimed “strict 
constructionist.” His appointment was quite unremarkable and uncontroversial, though 
probably mostly because he was replacing a conservative Justice. 
Scalia was on the suggestion list that Burger gave Reagan, and Reagan’s team had 
already been considering him for a while. He had two major advantages: He was only 50 
and would be able to serve for a long time, and he was Italian-American. His ethnicity 
was perceived as an advantage going into the nomination process and could serve to build 
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conservative capital among Italian-Americans (Maltese 126). Reagan also liked Scalia’s 
“gruff charm,” which might have contributed to postponing the nomination of Bork, the 
longtime conservative favorite (Toobin 18). In addition, there were fears that Bork would 
be perceived as so conservative that both nominations would be in danger (Bronner 17). 
The Democrats tried to mount opposition to Rehnquist’s nomination, but that 
proved to be a failing strategy. When the hearings began in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, only a few days after the Rehnquist hearings, there was very little opposition. 
Scalia was praised by members of both parties, and the chairman, Republican Storm 
Thurmond, began by emphasizing Scalia’s ethnicity (Scalia hearings, 2). This trend 
continued, and the most critical questions came from Senator Edward Kennedy. He began 
by asking Scalia bluntly if he would uphold Roe v. Wade (Ibid. 37). Scalia emphasized 
that he could not comment on specific cases, and when pressed by Kennedy he said he 
would uphold some earlier decisions, even if they might have been wrongly decided. Joe 
Biden asked how strictly Scalia would adhere to the text of the Constitution, and Scalia 
again moderated himself by saying that although he did not support interpreting it 
different from day to day there was still some “evolutionary content” there (Ibid. 49). The 
Senators were generally short and cordial in their questioning, and several came and went 
during the hearing. Biden asked a question that had already been addressed by Scalia 
when Biden was out of the room, and it was evident that Democrats were not organizing 
to put up a fight (Ibid. 50). Both the committee and the Senate approved Scalia 
unanimously. Liberal groups tried to organize protests, but there was just “no appetite” 
for another fight among Democrats (Davis 153). 
Although the Iran-Contra affair was brewing at the time, it had not yet blown up, 
and Reagan still had a relatively positive image after reelection, along with a Republican 
majority in the Senate. Antonin Scalia’s judicial views were well known, and under other 
circumstance he would probably have faced fierce opposition from liberals. But the 
Democrats would probably have had difficulties in sinking either Rehnquist or Scalia, 
and since the outgoing Chief Justice was a conservative, the balance on the Court was not 
in danger. Another lost fight might have reflected badly upon Democrats who were 
positioning themselves for the election later the same year. Senator Kennedy of 
Massachusetts may possibly have been strategically restrained in order to court Italian-
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Americans in his home state, as Scalia would be confirmed anyway (Cannon 806). 
Almost 20 years later, Samuel Alito would later benefit from his nomination being 
overshadowed by a Chief Justice nomination, in some ways similar to Scalia’s situation. 
The Democrats were unable to muster enough resistance to Scalia and Alito’s 
nominations following a national debate over the choice of Chief Justice. 
Scalia, along with Clarence Thomas, has emerged as one of the most conservative 
members of the Court, although the newcomers Roberts and Alito might be labeled 
similarly after more years on the bench. Scalia was not happy with the fact that the 
Rehnquist Court was not reliably conservative. Jeffrey Rosen claims that Scalia “would 
focus more on defending his own ideological purity than on persuading skeptical 
colleagues, and would alienate them in the process” (Rosen 193). Jeffrey Toobin argues 
that Scalia was bored with the job already in 1996, and that he was unhappy with his lack 
of influence and his share of important opinions. With two new conservative Justices 
joining the court in 2005, it would seem to be an improvement for Scalia. But they did 
not align themselves perfectly with him, and Toobin claims Scalia that is still dissatisfied 
(Toobin 318). 
In Scalia’s dissent to the 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush that granted more 
rights to the prisoners at Guantanamo, he wrote that it “will almost certainly cause more 
Americans to be killed” (Boumediene v. Bush 111). Scalia’s opinions are often colorful 
and widely cited, and he might also consciously aim for a larger conservative audience 
since his influence on the Court is limited. Scalia has cut his own path, being a strict 
constructionist and seemingly unafraid of distancing himself from the other justices. He 
has served Reagan’s conservative mission for 22 years, though it has been hindered by 
his lack of persuasive power and willingness to compromise.  
 
5.4 Robert Bork (1987) 
Robert Bork had been a hero of conservatives since the beginning of Reagan’s presidency 
and his nomination had been widely expected (Parry-Giles 119). When it finally was 
Bork’s turn in 1987, Reagan’s presidency had entered its most difficult phase. The 
Democrats had taken back the Senate in the 1986 elections and the Iran-Contra scandal 
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was unraveling. Democrats were re-energized by their victories and finally had a chance 
to mount an all-out offensive against a conservative nominee. Most of the literature on 
the Supreme Court views Bork’s nomination as a turning point, because media coverage, 
partisanship, and interest group involvement have increased since. Bork had been 
outspoken about his conservative views during his judicial career and although he tried to 
modify his image in the confirmation hearings, the political climate at the time added 
further damage to his chances. 
 Lewis Powell announced his retirement on June 26, 1987 without any advance 
notice to the president (Bronner 16). He had been a moderate and centrist voice on the 
court, and Reagan now had a chance to make the court even more conservative. The 
surprise element might have helped Bork’s chances with Reagan, as he had been on the 
list since 1981. But several administration officials were skeptical. White House Chief of 
Staff, Howard Baker, Counsel Arthur B. Culvahouse, and Communications Director 
Thomas Griscom did not agree with Attorney General Ed Meese, who was an ardent 
supporter of Bork. Many liberals were aware of these differences, and since Meese was 
caught up in the Iran-Contra scandal, Griscom was lobbied with warnings about the 
controversy Bork might cause (Bronner 21). D.C. Circuit Court judge Laurence 
Silberman was also considered (Greenburg 93), but Reagan made it clear that Bork was 
his first choice and was not going to give up on promoting one of the most ardent 
conservative judges to the Supreme Court.   
 Bork’s nomination was announced on July 1, only five days after Powell’s 
resignation. Reagan affirmed his judicial view by stating:  
 
Bork [is] widely regarded as the most prominent and intellectually powerful advocate of 
judicial restraint, [and] shares my view that judges’ personal preferences and values 
should not be part of their constitutional interpretations. (Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library) 
 
This would probably be Reagan’s last nomination, and he wanted to complete his agenda 
to create a conservative majority on the court. Bork was rated as “exceptionally well 
qualified” by the American Bar Association, and his intellect and judicial credentials 
were not in doubt (Cannon 806). But his earlier outspokenness and his long history of 
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controversial statements would haunt him from the day he was nominated. Later the same 
day, Ted Kennedy made his famous speech about “Bork’s America”: 
 
Robert Bork’s America is a land in which women would be forced into back alley 
abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down 
citizens’ doors in midnight raids, school children could not be taught about evolution, 
writers and artists could be censored at the whim of government, and the doors of the 
federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of citizens for whom the judiciary 
is - and is often the only – protector of the individual rights that are the heart of 
democracy. (Cannon 807) 
 
Kennedy, like Reagan, had made a gamble. The speech was a departure from the tone of 
earlier nominations. In the hearings, Kennedy would continue attacking Bork. Bork’s 
long history of public statements about law made it easier to attack him than many 
previous nominees. Kennedy justified his aggressiveness with by argument that the seat 
that was up for nomination was a critical swing vote. His reasoning for using the 
language he did was that “the masses are not going to rise up over the issue of 
congressional standing. But they will over freedom in the bedroom” (Bronner 90). This 
was also part of his strategy to label Bork before anyone else could. He contacted former 
aides of his brothers and all black elected officials in the country in order to build a 
movement (Ibid. 91). Republicans were satisfied with the choice, and Bork enjoyed much 
respect from other judges. Justice Stevens also made a surprise statement and praised 
Bork in a speech (Taylor, “Stevens”). Liberals were well prepared because Bork’s 
nomination had been expected for many years, and after Scalia’s nomination there were 
leaks from the White House that Bork would likely be the next nominee (O’Brien 74). 
Bork was more willing to talk in the hearings than some former nominees. He 
engaged in debate with senators, and several commentators agree that the hearings 
featured some of the most thorough constitutional debate ever in a nomination hearing. 
Bork’s legal point of view was that the courts had been inventing new constitutional 
rights. They exercised too much power in promoting pluralism and the positive 
discrimination of women, minorities, the poor, and criminals (Bronner 318). He had also 
in several speeches promoted the view that precedent that did not square with an 
originalist view of the Constitution, should be overruled with no hesitation (Bronner 
229).  
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But Bork’s major theme in the hearings seemed to be to modify his earlier 
statements. When asked about decisions that should be overruled, he instead cleverly 
used examples of wrongful decisions that he thought should be respected as precedent. 
He also stated that he valued precedence because there “is a need for predictability in 
legal doctrine” (Bronner 230). He was confronted with an audio recording from a speech 
he had made:  
 
I don’t think that in the field of constitutional law precedent is all that important….If you 
become convinced that a prior court has misread the Constitution, I think it’s your duty to 
go back and correct it.” (Taylor, “How”) 
  
When pushed about the statements, he said that it was “off-the-cuff” and that he had 
always included the idea that “some law was too entrenched” even if it was wrong 
(Bronner 230). He also would not comment specifically when asked about the right to 
privacy. He was critical of the rational used to ban sterilization of retarded people 
(Shaffer 114, 124). Although he did not say he was in favor of reversing either practice, 
his statements helped his opponents in maintaining the public perception of him as an 
ideologue. To allow all senators to ask their questions, the hearings were extended into a 
Saturday. Arlen Specter, a moderate Republican senator from Pennsylvania, requested 
one and a half hour of questioning time, whereas the other senators needed five and ten 
minutes (Bronner 235). Specter went into detailed and critical questioning while 
expressing skepticism about Bork’s judicial views. 
Concluding his testimony, he stated that part of the reason he would like to be on 
the Court was that it would be an “intellectual feast,” which was not well received either 
(Bronner 245). Bork had been careful not to be specific about how he would vote, but his 
attitude and philosophy were very evident. He was very eager to be on the Court but at 
the same time he seemed to have trouble not coming a across as a man who thought he 
knew the law better than both senators and even justices. The reactions were mixed, and 
Senator Paul Simon, a Democrat, stated that he came out of the hearings with a respect 
for Bork, although he did not share his judicial views (Simon 65). But Bork’s attempts to 
appear moderate did not win many opponents over, and the New York Times wrote that 
“his testimony last week contrasted sharply with positions he has publicly espoused from 
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1971 until quite recently” (Taylor, “How”). An energized opposition had enough material 
to fuel their campaign.  
The hearings went on for twelve days in total. Seventeen organizations testified in 
Bork’s hearings, more than in any former nomination (Maltese 90) (Appendix 2). 
Democratic Senator Joseph Biden, who was the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, was a contender for the Democratic nomination for president. He was 
criticized by Republicans for opposing Bork, but his handling of the hearings was mostly 
considered fair (Greenhouse, “Washington”). He withdrew his candidacy during the 
hearings for other reasons, although his duties had hindered his campaigning (Dionne Jr., 
“Biden”). Several liberal law professors who testified promoted what the conservative 
Reagan biographer John Patrick Diggins calls a “postmodernist” view of the Constitution. 
Law was “not an ultimate source of authority” but an instrument that “could be used in 
light of its consequences, and not necessarily its intent” (Diggins 316). He claims that 
Reagan was in particular outraged by this, which seems to confirm Reagan’s critical 
attitude toward the activism of the Warren and Burger courts. 
Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming concluded that “[t]his will never happen 
again. … The next time we have a Supreme Court nominee he or she … will respectfully 
decline to give an opinion on whether any of the existing law on the Supreme Court is 
right or wrong” (Shaffer xiv). Senator Charles Grassley remarked that “never has a 
judicial nominee been so forthcoming in his views” (Ibid). Bork would later claim in a 
book that some of the senators simply did not understand what they were discussing, and 
he did not agree that it was a substantial constitutional debate (Ibid 134). In an interview 
with the D.C. Bar Association in 1998 he would also state that “by 1987 my attitude had 
changed … as solicitor general I’d argued lots of cases before the Supreme Court so I 
knew the Court wasn’t going to be the grand intellectual experience people imagine it to 
be” (“A Conversation”). If this was Bork’s attitude, it can be argued that his attempts to 
explain and argue specific cases could come across as arrogant and even cold and 
insensitive.  
Reagan made a total of 32 mentions of Bork in his public appearances, more than 
any president had done regarding a Supreme Court nominee up to that point (Maltese 
115) (Appendix 1). But at the time Reagan got involved, it might have been too late. 
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Reagan went away for a three-week vacation in August and did not contact any senators 
until after the hearings ended on September 30 (Cannon 808). Bork was disappointed 
with Reagan’s efforts, and when Griscom came up with the idea of letting Bork and his 
wife do a TV interview to “humanize” him before the committee vote, Bork rejected it as 
“below his dignity” (Bronner 283). He was not willing to campaign for his nomination.  
Reagan invited Dennis DeConcini, a prominent Democratic senator, to his office a 
few days before the Senate vote to persuade him to vote for Bork. His efforts were in 
vain. Republican Senator Arlen Specter had also made up his mind and stated in an 
interview that if Bork’s views had been the opinion of the Supreme Court, the Senate 
would have had segregated seats for blacks and whites (Baker, “Bork’s Shadow”). 
Reagan even received several Republican visitors who urged him to drop the nomination 
as they realized that their chances were diminishing (Vieira et al. 171). Bork decided to 
make a public statement about not withdrawing, and Reagan made a speech where he 
promised that the next nominee would upset Democrats “just as much” (Simon 64). 
Reagan showed his commitment to Bork, but it was too little too late to help his 
nomination. Bork went out of the Judiciary Committee with a 9-5 majority against him, 
and was defeated 42-58 in the Senate on October 23.  
The Bork nomination was a turning point in Supreme Court history. After his 
defeat, nominees would be more careful and reserved in their hearings. Even great legal 
minds will have problems in hearings if they do not watch their tongues. The Bork defeat 
also opened up nomination hearings for more organized efforts by interest groups. 
Whether it was the political circumstances or his history and personality that doomed his 
nomination is a matter of debate. There is no doubt that Bork’s statements provided his 
opponents with plenty of ammunition, but it is impossible to know if the Democrats 
would have defeated him in any event. Bork’s efforts to moderate his earlier views could 
not change the perception that he was a hard-line conservative. Bork has since stood by 
his earlier views, and in 2005 he stated that “[a] lot of conservatives are convinced that 
things would have been different if I had been confirmed.…A lot of liberals think it 
would have been different, too, and they don't like it” (Baker, “Bork’s Shadow”).  
Reagan was in a difficult political situation, but went with the much anticipated 
choice as Bork had been a long time conservative favorite for a seat on the Court. 
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Reagan’s aides did a good job of using media appearances to promote policy throughout 
his presidency. Though during this nomination, neither Reagan nor his staff realized how 
he might be able to help by contacting senators or speaking to the media before and 
during the hearings. Meese’s Iran-Contra problems at the Justice Department might have 
hindered him from doing a good job, and Reagan’s lack of initiative may be attributed to 
his general distance to day-to-day politics. Bork stated in 2005 that “[t]here was a 
massive political campaign against me and there was no political campaign on my 
behalf” (ibid). 
Reagan received a blow in a politically difficult time, but vowed to complete his 
mission to appoint a conservative. However, he had limited political capital to spend, and 
his next choice would prove to be even more damaging to his conservative Supreme 
Court project. 
 
5.5 Douglas Ginsburg (1987) 
Reagan’s next choice was Douglas H. Ginsburg, a 41-year old judge on the D.C. Circuit 
Court and former Harvard Law professor. His nomination was announced on 29 October 
1987, only six days after the Senate rejected Bork. In the Justice Department, Attorney 
General Meese blamed the White House staff for not doing a good enough job on Bork 
and pressured Reagan about nominating Ginsburg (O’Brien 76). Ginsburg was 
considered a more reliable conservative than Anthony Kennedy, a California judge who 
had been on the list since the beginning and who was preferred by White House aides 
(Cannon 809). There was some concern that a long battle over the conservative Ginsburg 
could delay the appointment till after Reagan’s presidency, but Meese prevailed by 
sending his predecessor William French Smith to talk to Reagan (Ibid.). Age was also an 
issue, as the younger Ginsburg would likely extend Reagan’s legacy on the Court.  
Senator Kennedy instantly heated up the already poisonous climate by announcing 
that Ginsburg was “an ideological clone of Bork” (Vieira et al. 183). Ginsburg had been 
appointed to the appeals court the year before, and the American Bar Association had 
barely rated him qualified because of his minimal experience (Taylor, “Man”).  In the 
days after his nomination, there were reports of Ginsburg’s involvement in a cable TV 
 51 
company that would benefit from deregulation, and that he had filed a brief before the 
Supreme Court in favor of deregulation (Ibid. 184). This was followed by reports that his 
wife, a medical doctor, had performed abortions. Ginsburg had served as a clerk to 
Justice Marshall, and a fellow clerk and his ex-wife stated in the media that he was not a 
“Bork clone” and not particularly conservative (Gamarekian, “Ginsburg”). Before the 
public debate had begun, it was revealed that he had used marihuana as a law professor. 
These allegations doomed his candidacy. William Bennett, Secretary of Education, was 
given the task by Reagan to call Ginsburg and ask him to withdraw, which he did on 
November 8 (Cannon 810).  
Ginsburg’s later record shows that he held on to his conservative views. In a 2002 
speech to the CATO institute, a conservative think-tank, he criticized the Court for ruling 
that Roosevelt’s New Deal programs were constitutional, as well as disagreeing with 
Griswold v. Connecticut which recognized a right of privacy and allowed married 
couples to use contraceptives (Schwartz 4). 
The failure of the Ginsburg nomination left Reagan with very little political 
capital to spend on his next nomination. The embattled Ed Meese had pushed a hard line 
in his choice of nominees, and Reagan had gone along with him. Possibly because he was 
occupied with the Iran-Contra problems, Meese had not ensured that the Justice 
Department and the FBI did a thorough background check of Ginsburg. Meese was a 
very strong influence long history with Reagan, their relationship dating back to 
Reagan’s governorship in California. Reagan put a lot of trust in his close advisors and 
with his limited involvement in the process, he underestimated the risk of nominating 
another judge with a clearly conservative record. Ginsburg would probably have met a lot 
of resistance from Democrats even without the scandals. So soon after the heated battle 
over Bork any candidate with a controversial background would be difficult to confirm. 
The lack of scrutiny that went into Ginsburg’s background was yet another lesson for a 
Reagan team that had already made a miscalculation regarding Bork’s chances. 
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5.6 Anthony Kennedy (1987) 
The failure of the Ginsburg nomination left Reagan with little choice but to nominate his 
third choice for the seat: Anthony Kennedy, a Californian and a judge on the Ninth 
Circuit Court. David H. Souter’s name was mentioned briefly after a recommendation by 
his friend Warren Rudman, a Republican senator from New Hampshire, but Meese 
preferred the fellow Californian Kennedy (Yarbrough 95). Lou Cannon described 
Kennedy as a “straight-arrow” and “mainstream” man who “had never expressed his 
personal views on abortion in his writings” (Cannon 810). This was exactly what Reagan 
needed at the time. Kennedy’s nomination was announced on November 11 1987, only 
three days after Ginsburg’s withdrawal, and it was evident that Reagan wanted to get it 
over with (Simon 67).  
Kennedy was sent to meet with senators to promote his candidacy. In his book, 
Senator Paul Simon describes how Kennedy’s diplomatic manners earned him respect 
with both Democrats and Republicans. After Kennedy had spoken to Republican ranking 
member Orrin Hatch by phone and lauded him for his questioning of Bork and chatted 
with Democrat Robert Byrd on his interest in Senate history, the White House received 
green signals from both parties (Simon 67). Lou Cannon describes Senate liberals as 
“overjoyed” as they considered Kennedy the best nominee they could get from the 
Reagan White House (Cannon 811).  
The hearings turned out to be close to the opposite of what Bork had gone 
through. Few reporters showed up, and there was little media coverage. Kennedy was 
careful in his statements, and he did not signal any hard-line conservative views. He was 
pressed by Republican Senator Charles Grassley on whether there was an activist 
consensus among law professors and in academia, but would not agree (Kennedy 
hearings 212). When asked by Senator Specter, liberal Harvard Law Professor Laurence 
Tribe supported Kennedy’s statements about the Constitution as a document that will be 
interpreted in light of both its original words and in light of what has happened since 
(Ibid. 348). The committee recommended him unanimously, and the Senate confirmed 
him by a 97-0 vote.  
Reagan was satisfied with the outcome, and he showed little sign of being 
embarrassed by the process regarding Bork and Ginsburg. Lou Cannon argues that thi
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was because he had “little personal connection with either man” (Cannon 811). Also, 
Reagan’s usual distance to the decision-making process and his concern for the larger 
ideas might have caused him not worry to about it.  
In the first years of Kennedy’s service, Reagan and Meese had every reason to be 
happy with the appointee. Cannon, writing in 1991, characterizes Kennedy “as 
dependably conservative as Bork would have been” (Cannon 811). On matters like 
federalism, he would continue to mostly support the conservative justices’ agenda to 
reverse the New Deal precedents that allowed a great amount of federal regulation (Moen 
76). But his views on social issues would change considerably over the years. Jeffrey 
Toobin describes how Kennedy, who had been a world traveler since his youth, was 
gradually influenced by what he experienced outside of the United States (Toobin 184). 
He argues that Kennedy also was influenced by foreign guests that the Justices 
entertained in Washington (Ibid. 186). Kennedy has gradually been drifting toward the 
center. He reaffirmed Roe v. Wade in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992, and social 
conservatives were very disappointed when he in 2003 wrote the majority opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas, overturning sodomy laws affirmed in Bowers v. Hardwick in 1986. 
The ruling, read aloud by Kennedy himself on the last day of the term, renounced the 
precedent and was viewed as a big victory by gay rights advocates (Toobin 190). 
Kennedy’s legacy is another lesson for conservative activists. After the failures of 
Bork and Ginsburg, Reagan was forced to nominate someone who appeared moderate. 
Kennedy turned out to find his own path, and his views on several issues evolved over 
time. The evolution of Kennedy’s views would lead conservatives to be even more wary 
of nominees that did not have a conservative record. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Ronald Reagan’s Supreme Court legacy is mixed when it is compared with his 
conservative judicial philosophy. Of the three new Justices he put on the court, two 
turned out to drift toward the political center. Of the six nominees he named, four are still 
considered reliable conservatives by most of the cited literature. The battle over Bork’s 
nomination marked a change in how nominees are chosen and presented to the public and 
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the Senate. Avoiding controversy became an even more important factor in getting a 
nominee through the confirmation process.  
Reagan’s Supreme Court nominations cannot just be looked upon in isolation. He 
had a larger strategy to change the judiciary. President Carter’s merit-based seniority 
system was not continued. Appointments to federal courts, which had not always been 
scrutinized and in some cases had been a tool to award friends and loyal servants, were 
now part of an ideological conflict. Ronald Reagan’s team, in large part influenced by Ed 
Meese, set out to make the federal judiciary more conservative. The Reagan team would 
keep large lists of conservatives who could be trusted to further his agenda from the 
bench. The most promising of these judges were promoted to the federal circuit courts 
and closely watched with a future Supreme Court nomination in mind (Mauro, “Reagan’s 
Legacy”). The Federalist Society has proved to be a useful tool in maintaining a 
conservative legal community since it was founded in 1982 (“Our Background”). 
Reagan’s level of personal involvement is not perfectly clear. He put a lot of trust 
in Meese, who championed Bork and Ginsburg. Arthur B. Culvahouse claims that 
Reagan never discussed Roe v. Wade and other specifics and only wanted to avoid “more 
judges or justices who would invent new theories to set guilty criminals free” (ibid). 
Biographer John Patrick Diggins argues that Reagan did not identify with social 
conservatives and speculates that the reason might be his Hollywood background and 
experiences in his own family. Reagan seemed more aligned with the strict 
constructionist movement. Lou Cannon agrees and states that Reagan “did not share the 
view of those militant intellectuals … who sought to replace judicial activism of the Left 
with judicial activism of the Right” (Cannon 811). Conservatives’ worries about 
O’Connor’s social conservative credentials prior to her nomination did not seem to 
trouble Reagan, and his closest advisors did not present a case against her. When the 
Bork and Ginsburg nominations failed, Reagan was not distressed. Reagan trusted Meese, 
but seemed to not be visibly worried that the two most conservative choices were out of 
the race. He might have been more content with O’Connor and Kennedy than the social 
conservative movement is. 
The social conservative movement has continued to increase its influence on the 
Republican Party, and a relatively unknown candidate like Sandra Day O’Connor might 
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today have run into the same problems that Harriet Miers would later do. That movement 
has grown to be able to influence judicial nominations in much greater ways since the 
O’Connor nomination. The conservative movement’s rise since Reagan’s presidency was 
made possible by a merging of religious and social conservatives with business interests 
and wealthy traditional Republicans. Rehnquist, with the help of Scalia, and later 
Thomas, set out to undermine much of the New Deal legislation that had allowed the 
federal government to regulate matters that were previously up to the states. 
 The Bork hearings and the extensive media coverage that accompanied them 
changed the nomination process. Later nominees have been more careful in discussing 
legal theory and indicating how they would vote. The vetting process has also been 
affected, and candidates with many public statements or controversial pasts are less likely 
to be nominated. Ronald Reagan’s judicial policies changed the way the federal judges 
are appointed, and although his Supreme Court appointments have a mixed record when 
it comes to conservatism, he has put his mark on both the highest and the lower courts. 
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6. George H. W. Bush 
 
During the presidency of George H. W. Bush, two long-serving liberal justices retired, 
William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. They were both appointed during the Warren 
Court, and their retirements provided an opportunity for Bush to continue Reagan’s 
mission to make the judiciary more conservative. The retirements also had a historic 
significance, as Brennan and Marshall were the last liberal members of the Warren Court 
to retire and Marshall had been the first African-American justice. The era of liberal 
activism was over and was followed by an effort by the conservative justices to undo 
some of the achievement of the Warren Court. Bork had raised the stakes for 
nominations, and Bush put forward two nominees that he hoped would be confirmed 
without much controversy. He was successful in the case of David Souter, but the 
nomination of Clarence Thomas brought about even more debate and media attention 
than Bork did. 
George H. W. Bush served one term as president. His presidency is still a subject 
of debate by scholars. He has been accused of lacking the “vision thing” (Greenstein, 
“Difference” 170). Following Reagan, under whom he had been vice president, he is 
viewed as less effective as a communicator, but as an effective and much respected 
administrator. Initially chosen as a running mate because of his moderate record, he did 
not take the social conservative movement any more seriously than Reagan did (Ibid. 
163). 
Bush relied to a large extent on his advisors and the groundwork of research done 
by the Reagan administration for his nominations (O’Brien 77). The replacement for 
Brennan, David H. Souter, was relatively unknown and raised few controversies during 
the nomination. Marshall’s replacement, however, the conservative black judge Clarence 
Thomas, became the subject of intense media scrutiny. Souter’s appointment has later 
been deemed a “mistake” by many conservatives as he turned out to vote more with the 
liberal wing of the Court than the conservatives. The controversies surrounding Thomas’ 
nomination matched the Bork nomination in media coverage, as there was a mix of race 
questions, sexual allegations, and charges of extreme conservatism.  
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6.1 David H. Souter (1990) 
On July 20, 1990, William Brennan wrote a letter to President George H. W. Bush to 
announce his retirement. Brennan was 84 years old and had been on the Court since he 
was appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956. Brennan a Catholic and was 
known as a Democrat, and Eisenhower wanted to appeal to these groups since it was 
close to the presidential election (Davis 47). Brennan was an important player on the 
Warren Court, building consensus and often taking leadership within the liberal wing. 
Yet he also showed a temper and wrote fierce dissents at times. After his long service he 
enjoyed much respect from both liberals and conservatives. His liberalism was a 
dominant factor in the debate around his replacement, as a replacement would alter the 
balance of the Court in a major way. Thurgood Marshall, another liberal and only two 
years younger than Brennan, was also expected to retire soon, and many observers 
thought that Bush would have the opportunity to replace both. This further raised the 
stakes for the upcoming nomination.  
 Bush made it clear to his staff that he wanted to decide on a replacement within 48 
hours to minimize the possibility for Democrats to prepare for criticizing his choice as 
had happened with Bork. At the time Bush was in a difficult position, as the federal 
deficit had increased greatly since the Reagan years, and he was considering agreeing to a 
Democratic bill that would increase taxes (Greenburg 88). Facing a Democratic majority 
in the Senate, Bush needed to avoid a confirmation battle. The major players in the short 
and intensive process to find a nominee would be White House Chief of Staff John 
Sununu, White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray, and Attorney General Dick Thornburgh. 
Thornburg had been appointed by Reagan to replace the controversial Ed Meese, and 
Bush had chosen to keep him in his post.  
 At the White House, Gray recommended Solicitor General Kenneth Starr to 
Sununu. Starr had a long record of service for Reagan, and had served on the D.C. Circuit 
Court before resigning from that prestigious post to become solicitor general. The White 
House staff had researched several possible candidates to prepare for a vacancy on the 
Court, but Gray had focused mainly on Starr, since he presumed he was the most likely 
candidate (Ibid. 89). At the Justice Department, Thornburgh with his Deputy Attorney 
General J. Michael Luttig, had agreed that Starr was not “focused” enough and could 
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possibly drift toward the left (Ibid. 91). Luttig was a Texan, like Starr, but more 
conservative and would later be considered by George W. Bush for the Court.  
 In a meeting with the president on July 21 Thornburgh began by announcing that 
he thought Starr was not conservative enough, to the surprise of both Gray and the 
president. He was even willing to resign if Starr was nominated, and there was quickly an 
understanding that Starr was out. They then ruled out Laurence Silberman, also on the 
D.C. Circuit Court, because of his temperament and controversial statements he had 
made earlier. Bush said he liked Clarence Thomas, a black conservative who had worked 
in the Reagan administration. He was only 42 years old at the time and had limited 
judicial experience. Thomas had been appointed to the D.C. Circuit Court the year 
before, and Thornburgh and Gray were in agreement; he was a good candidate but it was 
too soon for him (Ibid. 93). Edith Jones, a conservative Southern judge on the Fifth 
Circuit Court, was also mentioned. Bush then turned to discuss David H. Souter, who had 
been appointed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals just a few months earlier. Souter, 51 
years old and a native of New Hampshire, did not appear to have any skeletons in the 
closet, but not much was known from his writings. The meeting was inconclusive, but 
Gray focused his further vetting on Souter and Jones (ibid.).  
 Behind the scenes, Republican Senator Warren Rudman of New Hampshire had 
begun working to promote his good friend Souter. Rudman, a moderate Republican, had 
helped Sununu being elected governor of New Hampshire. Sununu had returned the favor 
by appointing Souter to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Bush asked for interviews 
with Souter and Jones, and Sununu decided to make his push by recommending Souter 
(Ibid. 97). Rudman phoned Bush to make his case and said that Souter was “easily 
confirmable,” had “no skeletons in the closet,” and was one of “the most extraordinary 
human beings” he had known (Yarbrough 100). At the same time Gray and Thornburgh 
were worried about how the younger and more conservative Jones would fare in the 
Judiciary Committee hearings. Bush eventually went with the more scholarly Souter, who 
was also a fellow New Englander (Greenburg 101).   
 The reactions were mixed. Souter was unknown to most, and Justice Thurgood 
Marshall dryly replied that he had “never heard of him” when asked by a reporter. 
Sununu tried to appease conservatives by saying that Souter would be a “home run” 
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(Toobin 21). The White House Communication office prepared letters and editorials that 
portrayed Souter as a strong “law-and-order judge” (Greenburg 102). But doubts had 
already begun to spread in the White House and among conservative activists. 
Newspapers described him as an eccentric and frugal bachelor, and he did not do well in 
the preparation sessions for the hearings (Ibid. 103). Sununu was approached by several 
conservative activists, among them Paul Weyrich, who were disappointed that Jones was 
not picked. Some raised concerns that Souter could be a closet homosexual since he had 
never married. To avoid possible damaging rumors, Rudman contacted chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee, Joseph Biden, to offer female witnesses that could confirm that 
Souter was not gay. Biden “laughingly” declined but the fact that such concerns were 
brought up bothered Souter who confided to Rudman that he considered withdrawing 
(Yarbrough 124). 
 The fears over how well Souter would perform in the hearings were unfounded, as 
his testimony was considered flawless and would later become a model for other 
candidates. However, conservatives were alarmed by the things he actually said. Souter 
praised Justice Brennan and said that he “would be remembered as one of the most 
fearlessly principled guardians of the American Constitution that it has ever had and ever 
will have” (Souter hearings, 186). He said that the Warren Court rulings, despised by 
many conservatives, had been a “pragmatic implementation” of the Bill of Rights and 
that Americans had lived well with them (Ibid. 64). Roe v. Wade was specifically 
avoided, but Souter was questioned about the right to privacy recognized in Griswold v. 
Connecticut in 1965, where the right of married couples to use contraceptives was 
acknowledged. Souter agreed and referred to the much respected Justice John Marshall 
Harlan who had supported that view from a pragmatic perspective (Ibid. 54). 
Despite a testimony that could be perceived as very moderate, several liberals 
voiced their opposition. The NAACP stated that Souter “failed to articulate that level of 
concern for fairness, equality and justice for all citizens that should be present in any 
individual taking a seat on the Court” (Molotsky, “N.A.A.C.P.”). The National 
Organization for Women distributed leaflets saying “Stop Souter or Women will Die” 
during the time of the hearings (Toobin 44). But many Democrats realized that Souter 
might be the best appointment they could get. Neither the NAACP nor the ACLU 
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officially opposed the nomination, as they had with Bork (Greenhouse, “Defining”). 
During the debates before the final vote in the Senate, Democratic Senator Paul Simon 
asked “is it likely that President Bush will send a nominee with more moderate views 
than Judge Souter?” He then went on to predict that Souter would vote to uphold Roe v. 
Wade (“Proceedings” 26973). Senator Rudman also talked privately to Democratic 
senators, assuring them that they should not be concerned regarding Roe v. Wade 
(Greenburg 164). The Senate vote was 90-9 in favor of his confirmation, and the votes 
against him were all cast by Democrats.  
The Souter appointment soon turned out to be a disappointment for conservatives. 
Souter initially assumed a centrist position at the Court, but sided with liberals to uphold 
abortion rights in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992. Linda Greenhouse, who was the 
Supreme Court reporter for the New York Times at the time, concluded after his first two 
terms in 1992 that his home was at the center. Commenting on his critical role, she said 
that “to find out where the Supreme Court is, look for David Souter” (Greenhouse, 
“Souter”). Souter has been a supporter of stare decisis, by upholding earlier decisions that 
have become ingrained in American society, especially those from the Warren Court. In 
that sense he has lived up to the pragmatism of his ideal John Marshall Harlan. Yet few 
writers perceive this as a personal turnaround by Souter. The fact that so little was known 
about his views, and that he as a New England conservative probably did not identify 
with the social conservative movement at the time, makes it difficult to argue that he had 
a change of heart. Although he has since become labeled as a liberal, this might have 
more to do with the fact that the old, outspoken liberals on the Court are now gone. After 
the retirements of Brennan and Marshall, the liberal wing consisted of more moderate 
members like Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Souter announced in a letter to 
president Obama on May 1, 2009 that he would retire after the end of the term.  
While the mission to avoid another “Souter” has become a running theme among 
many conservatives, the criticism has been just as much directed against the president 
that appointed him. Bush made a conscious choice to avoid controversy in a situation 
where he had to make unpopular decisions and at the same time faced a Democratic 
majority. In light of Souter’s legacy, Bush might regret his choice. Attorney General 
Thornburgh’s veto of the well-vetted and loyal Kenneth Starr is probably viewed as a 
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mistake by conservatives in hindsight. But even if Thornburgh had approved of Starr, he 
might very well have faced a difficult battle in the Democratic Senate and with social 
conservatives. After Souter, those conservatives were less likely to permit a president to 
take chances on candidates with less known views, regardless of the political situation. 
 
6.2 Clarence Thomas (1991) 
Thurgood Marshall announced his plans to retire from the Court in a letter to President 
Bush on June 27, 1991. Marshall was 82, and although his health was poor, most people 
assumed that he would await the presidential election before resigning (Phelps et al. 2). 
Marshall was the first black member of the Court. He had been solicitor general for 
President Johnson and was a veteran of the civil rights movement who had argued several 
segregation cases before the Court. Clarence Thomas was widely expected to be 
nominated because of his race and the scarcity of other qualified minority candidates that 
were conservative enough. In a press conference regarding his resignation, Marshall was 
very forthcoming about the likely nominee. He did not mention Thomas by name, but 
stated that his own ethnicity should not “be used as an excuse” for “[p]icking the wrong 
Negro.” He went on to say that “there’s no difference between a white snake and a black 
snake. They’ll both bite” (Toobin 25).  
 Thomas had been appointed to the D.C. Circuit Court in 1989 by President Bush. 
Thomas’ personal story was compelling and was emphasized by Bush when the 
nomination was announced. Thomas had grown up in Georgia, raised by his grandfather 
because his mother was too poor to care for him, and had worked himself through school 
and college (Ibid. 26). Yet he had benefited from the kind of affirmative action programs 
he opposed, both during his college education and for his position on the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission during the Reagan administration.  
 The Bush team was largely in agreement on the choice. Bush, Gray, Sununu, 
Thornburg, and Vice President Dan Quayle had a brief discussion before Bush left for his 
summer home at Kennebunkport, Maine. Edith Jones was mentioned again, but Bush 
made it clear that she would probably cause too much controversy because of her well 
known conservative views. Thornburgh and Sununu considered the possibility of a 
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Hispanic nominee. Emilio M. Garza, a judge on the Fifth Circuit Court, was labeled “too 
green” after he was interviewed (Phelps et al. 8).  
 On June 30, Bush called Thomas and told him to travel to Maine the next day. 
Bush offered him the job when he arrived, and they held a press conference in the garden 
of Bush’ summer home (Ibid. 13). Asked about whether Thomas was nominated because 
of his race, Bush stated that “the fact that he is black and a minority has nothing to do 
with this in the sense that he is the best qualified at this time” (“Excerpts”). The statement 
was not considered credible either by conservatives nor liberals, as there had been a great 
pressure to appoint another minority member. Also, there were very few writings by 
Thomas available and he had never argued a case before a federal appeals court or the 
Supreme Court (Toobin 26).  
  When Thomas testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in September, 
there was little controversy. Thomas made a thorough effort not to answer in specifics, 
probably eager to avoid repeating Bork’s mistakes. Senator Kennedy grew annoyed by 
Thomas’ evasive answers on abortion and stated: “You ask us to believe that an 
intelligent and outspoken person like yourself has never discussed Roe v. Wade with 
another human being” (Thomas hearings. Part 1, 452). The real controversy would not 
start until October however, after the committee had split its vote 7-7 on recommending 
Thomas. 
 A young law professor, Anita Hill, had served with Thomas in the Department of 
Education and on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. During that time, she 
claimed to have experienced several sexual approaches from Thomas. These allegations 
began to circulate in Democratic circles, but Hill was reluctant to come out publicly. 
Joseph Biden, the committee chairman, was afraid of the publicity and the explosive race 
questions that the allegations could result in. He suggested that Hill would have to let the 
FBI investigate it for the committee to consider it. That would mean that she had to go on 
the record with her name (Phelps et al. 214). On September 23, three days after the last 
hearing, Hill decided to submit her statement to the committee (Ibid. 216). The content 
was both controversial and explosive, and would eventually make the Bork controversy 
look tame in comparison. The Judiciary Committee decided to call Hill to testify on 
October 11. 
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 Thomas reappeared at the beginning of the extended hearings, where he denied 
that he had acted the way Hill claimed. He provided a defiant statement and invoked the 
racial undertones by stating: 
 
This is a circus. It is a national disgrace. And from my standpoint, as a black American, 
as far as I am concerned, it is a high-tech lynching for uppity-blacks who in any way 
deign to think for themselves, to do for themselves, to have different ideas, and it is a 
message that, unless you kow-tow to an old order, this is what will happen to you, you 
will be lynched, destroyed, caricatured by a committee of the U.S. Senate, rather than 
hung from a tree. (Thomas hearings, part 4. 10) 
 
In Hill’s testimony, she detailed the allegations against Thomas. During the time they had 
worked together, she claimed he had approached her many times about going out. She 
had turned him down, and he began to talk about graphic scenes in pornographic movies, 
made crude jokes, as well as talking about his own sexual adventures (Ibid. 37). The 
senators grilled her for details on the working relationships. Statements from several 
people who worked with Hill and Thomas were included, and these people also disagreed 
on what had happened. Hill claimed not to know if he had made such statements to 
anyone else and said he would usually stop after she told him one or more times that she 
was not interested in hearing it (Ibid. 74). Republican Senator Orrin Hatch implied that an 
alleged remark by Thomas about a pubic hair was something Hill had taken from the 
movie The Exorcist (Ibid. 206). A male co-worker claimed that Hill fantasized that men 
around her made approaches towards her, including him, though in his case he denied 
doing so (Ibid. 97). A female co-worker made a testimony where she claimed that Hills’s 
statements sounded like “schizophrenia,” and that Hill was used as a “pawn” by interest 
groups and was doing it for personal advancement (Ibid. 338, 386). Hill’s version was 
supported by another co-worker who stated: “If you were young, black, female and 
reasonably attractive, you knew full well you were being inspected and auditioned as a 
female” (Thomas hearings. Part 3, 1022). 
 Bush actively supported Thomas by promoting him in speeches and media 
appearances. He mentioned Thomas a total of 24 times, more than any other nominee up 
to that point except Bork (Maltese 115). Bush was less popular with the most the most 
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conservative members of the Republican Party than Reagan, and made a thorough effort 
to back Thomas to prove his commitment with that constituency. 
The finale vote came down on October 15, and Thomas was confirmed by a very 
narrow margin, 52 to 48, 107 days after his nomination was announced. The White 
House was worried about investigative reporters, and since the swearing-in ceremony 
was scheduled for November 1, a party was arranged at the White House lawn on 
October 18. It featured a mock swearing-in by Justice White, but failed to stop the news 
media speculation. The White House went to the very unusual step of asking Chief 
Justice Rehnquist to swear in Thomas on October 23, only a few days after the funeral of 
Rehnquist’s wife. According to Jeffrey Toobin, the Washington Post withdrew a story 
about Thomas’ renting of pornographic videos because he was now officially sworn in 
(33).   
 Thomas has since become known as the most conservative and most originalist 
justice on the Court. To an even greater extent than Scalia, he votes his conscience and 
does not make much effort to compromise. His experiences in the hearings might have 
caused him to shed the fear of standing alone, but like Scalia he lacks persuasive power 
to convince moderate justices. Thomas’ steadfast views may have led O’Connor to move 
even further toward the center as her way of working was that of a legislator by finding 
room for compromise (Greenburg 122). Media coverage of Thomas has often compared 
him to Scalia, if not implying that he follows Scalia. Greenburg points out that this is a 
mistaken assumption, as Scalia has joined Thomas as much as the other way around 
(Ibid. 125). Of the current Justices, he is among those who are the most willing to 
overturn precedent that he thinks breaks with the Framers’ intent. In his concurrence in 
United States v. Lopez in 1995, which overturned the Gun-Free School Zones Act, he did 
not think the Court went far enough. He argued: “In a future case, we ought to temper our 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our more recent 
case law and is more faithful to the original understanding of that Clause.” (United States 
v. Lopez). He wanted to revisit and overturn the precedent which has allowed for 
Congress to regulate matters related to interstate commerce. Since 1937 this 
interpretation has been essential for the federal government’s increased involvement in 
people’s lives, ranging from welfare to business regulation to gun control. 
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 When Thomas released an autobiography in 2007, he confessed to still being 
angry about the Hill controversies (Dolin, “Anger”). Thomas’ independence is even more 
evident than Scalia’s. At the oral arguments, he very rarely asks questions. He dissents 
frequently. This contributes to him being viewed as an outsider and not part of the 
process where important compromises are made. However, he is revered in conservative 
circles and a very popular guest in places like the Federalist Society.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
Despite the disappointment about Souter, Bush’s appointments definitively made the 
Court more conservative. Souter, who was soon viewed as a liberal, was not as 
ideologically rigid as either Brennan or Marshall was. Thomas has firmly established 
himself on the conservative wing, arguably to the right of Scalia. For the conservative 
movement, the goal has been a safe and lasting majority on the Court, and in that respect 
Bush failed, as did Reagan. With appointments like Kennedy and Souter, there was still a 
pragmatic center and the Court did not consistently do the bidding of social 
conservatives. But although Roe v. Wade was upheld in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 
1992, the conservative justices were gaining ground in other areas. The effort to reverse 
some of the Warren Court precedence regarding federal regulation had been there since 
the late 1970s, but with Souter and Thomas on board there were hopes for more 
conservative progress (Schwartz 100). 
 The “circus” surrounding Thomas, as he himself labeled it, would further 
contribute to thorough investigation of future nominees. Although he was confirmed and 
today is a favorite of conservatives, many would have wanted to avoid such a spectacle. 
Souter’s nomination could not have been more different than Thomas. But it also served 
to increase the research into candidates, as he did not provide the conservative vote that 
was expected from him. Souter’s nomination included testimonies from 25 organizations, 
which was a new record. That record was beaten the year after, when 43 organizations 
testified in Thomas’ hearings (Maltese 91). 
The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Joseph Biden, announced in 
1992 that the committee would have a closed-door session with every future nominee in 
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addition to the public hearings. The purpose was to be able to address any issues that had 
come to the attention of senators (Rutkus: “Roles” 37). This was most likely caused by 
the controversies surrounding Clarence Thomas. 
 Bush had to decide on his priorities, and considering the economic situation and 
his own reelection chances, he in the case of Souter made a conscious choice not to 
nominate a candidate that was known to be very conservative. In hindsight it is hard to 
predict what would have happened if Bush had nominated a candidate like Edith Jones. A 
highly contested confirmation battle could possibly have ended with a show of power by 
the Democratic majority in the Senate and forced him to put forward a candidate like 
Souter. That was the lesson from Reagan, who ended up with Kennedy after two 
controversial nominees had failed. Bush avoided the battle, but at the same time he lost 
credibility with the conservative movement. 
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7. Bill Clinton 
 
Bill Clinton was sworn in as president in January 1993 and would become the first 
Democratic president since Lyndon Johnson that would be able to appoint a Supreme 
Court Justice. The liberal agenda of the Warren Court, as well as its most activist 
members, had gradually diminished in the generation that had passed since the Johnson 
presidency.  
Clinton had been elected in a three-way race between himself, President Bush, 
and independent candidate Ross Perot. He had a record of being a pragmatic moderate as 
governor of Arkansas, and he would nominate candidates with similar records. 
(Greenstein, “Difference” 177). Justice Byron White, a Kennedy appointee who had 
grown increasingly conservative, was replaced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Stephen Breyer 
took the seat of Harry Blackmun, who had developed into one of the most liberal justices. 
Both Ginsburg and Breyer were perceived as more moderate than liberal when they were 
nominated. Scholars disagree to some extent on their current labels. While they 
undoubtedly belong to the liberal wing of the current Court, they have not been as 
consistently liberal as Brennan, Marshall, or Douglas from the Warren Court.  
The presidency of Bill Clinton is mostly known for its unprecedented economic 
growth, along with Clinton’s problematic relationship with the Republican Congress and 
his impeachment trial. Considering Reagan’s and Bush’s problems with their 
appointments, both regarding ideology and controversies, Clinton would do very 
thorough research regarding his candidates.  
 
7.1 Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1993) 
Justice Byron White, appointed by President John F. Kennedy, announced his retirement 
on March 19, 1993. He confided to a former clerk that he would like to be replaced by a 
candidate of a Democratic president, even though his views were mostly considered 
conservative (Toobin 61). White and Rehnquist were the only dissenters in Roe v. Wade. 
The retirement came only two months into Clinton’s presidency, and he had not received 
any prior notice of Justice White’s plans.  
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The first two months of Clinton’s presidency had been turbulent and his approval 
rating had gone down by more than 20 points. His two first nominees for attorney general 
had had to withdraw because they had hired illegal immigrants, and Congress failed to 
pass an important economic stimulus bill (Greenstein, “Difference” 179).  
Clinton gathered the Vice President and White House lawyers to discuss possible 
replacements the day after the resignation had become known. He wanted a solid leader 
type for the seat and stated that it had to be someone “who will move people” (Toobin 
63). Clinton was eager to put a non-judge on the Court, since the current members except 
for White were all former judges appointed by Republicans. Earl Warren had been a 
governor, and Clinton imagined someone with similar leadership skills. Mario Cuomo, 
the governor of New York, was mentioned, and several people liked the idea. George 
Stephanopoulos, who at the time was acting as press secretary, offered Cuomo the job. 
Cuomo was in doubt and said he needed time to think about it. It went back and forth for 
several days, and even when called up by the president, he could not give a definitive 
answer (Ibid. 64).  
The considerations went on through April and May, and several of the people 
involved in the process began leaking to the press, causing frustration at the White 
House. Clinton’s presidency had gotten off to a very rough start and another nominee at 
the Department of Justice had to withdraw. Clinton’s nominee for Assistant Attorney 
General, Lani Guinier, had received fierce criticism for viewpoints expressed in her 
academic writings. The Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, was favored by Clinton 
in June but for a number of reasons, including skeptical signals from Republican 
senators, he was dropped (Greenburg 167).  
Clinton was actively engaged in the discussions, and later in the process he sat 
down to read background material on candidates himself. After considering more names 
that were far down on the list of candidates, he realized that they needed to look 
elsewhere. Senator Kennedy had recommended Stephen Breyer, a judge on the First 
Circuit Court and a Harvard law professor. Clinton arranged an interview with Breyer. 
The interview did not go that well; Breyer seemed uncomfortable and did not impress 
Clinton. Breyer had been in a bicycle accident shortly before and had suffered broken 
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ribs and a punctured lung, which may have contributed to this impression (Lewis, 
“Political”).  
Clinton did not have other alternatives at the time and was still considering 
picking Breyer when his Attorney General Janet Reno suggested Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
(Toobin 69). Clinton had met Ginsburg when he was governor and was impressed by her 
then. She was a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court, had worked with the ACLU, and had 
been a significant player in the women’s rights movement in the 1970s. Her judging was 
well respected by her colleagues, both liberal and conservative, and she was a personal 
friend of Justice Scalia (Greenburg 168). She was called in for an interview that went 
very well, and Clinton received positive feedback from Republican Senator Orrin Hatch 
on the Senate Judiciary Committee (Ibid. 71).  
Clinton made up his mind and announced the nomination on June 14 in a press 
conference with Ginsburg. He praised her for her achievements and she made a statement 
about women’s progress and a reference to her late mother. An annoyed Clinton abruptly 
ended the press conference after only one question from the media, where it was pointed 
out that the decision-making process had had a “zig-zag quality” to it (Davis 3). 
The reactions were generally positive. Clinton had had to go through her opinions 
and speeches because there were uncertainties about her views on Roe v. Wade, but he 
felt that she would support it despite having criticized some of the reasoning behind it 
(ibid.). The New York Times stated that “it is debatable just how much she is either 
liberal or conservative” (Berke, “Ginsburg”). When preparing her for the hearings, she 
was shown videotapes of Souter’s testimony as an example of how to do it. She refused 
to watch the Bork tapes, as he was a colleague from the D.C. Circuit Court and she felt 
bad for him (Greenburg 170). 
  In the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, Orrin Hatch opened on a very 
positive note. He said he was skeptical of some of her earlier writings, but that her 
“judicial opinions, however, indicate her understanding that her policy views and earlier 
role as advocate are distinct from her role as a judge” (Ginsburg hearings, 6). Democratic 
Senator Howard Metzenbaum in fact asked her to clarify her earlier criticisms of Roe v. 
Wade, as he was worried about her negativity towards it (Ibid. 148). Ginsburg was very 
forthcoming in her answers, giving long and detailed answers and engaging senators’ 
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questions, but staying away from issues that might come before the Court. No 
Republicans criticized her association with the ACLU, often a favorite target of 
conservative criticism (Greenburg 171). 
 Ginsburg has been a reliable liberal vote on the Court since she took her seat. 
Although she has not displayed the aggressiveness in asserting ideological stances like 
earlier liberals, her record is clear. She has voted consistently in favor of abortion rights 
and affirmative action. The initial label she received as a moderate may have been a fair 
characteristic, but when put on a Court dominated by Republican appointees she did not 
surprisingly turn out to be one of the more liberal voices.  
When Justice O’Connor retired in 2005, Ginsburg would assert herself even more 
strongly in cases where the two had often shared views. When the Court upheld the ban 
on the so-called “partial-birth abortion” practice in 2007, she wrote a fierce dissent 
stating: “Today’s decision is alarming. It refuses to take and 	
seriously. 
It tolerates, indeed applauds federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure found 
necessary and proper” (Gonzales v. Carhart). When the decision was announced, she 
read the dissent aloud, which she very rarely does. Just a month later, the Court denied a 
woman the right to sue for sex discrimination because her claim was outdated in 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear. She had not discovered that she was paid less than male 
employees before the time limit to sue stated by law had run out. Ginsburg again read her 
decision aloud, accusing the majority of being “indifferent” to how “women can be 
victims of pay discrimination” (Greenburg 321). 
Ginsburg is one of the names that are often mentioned regarding possible 
retirements. She has been struck by cancer twice, recently undergoing surgery in 
February 2009. But her willingness to engage both her opponents and battle her disease 
may suggest that she intends to stay on. Clinton may have been positively surprised as 
she has proved to be more liberal than what was feared by some Democrats at the time of 
her nomination. 
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7.2 Stephen Breyer (1994) 
Justice Harry Blackmun announced his retirement on April 6, 1994 in a press conference 
with President Clinton. He was then 85 years old, and had hinted about retiring before, so 
it was not unexpected. Clinton stated that he had been informed several months before by 
Blackmun, which prompted a question from a reporter: “It took you three months the last 
time. Will it take you that long this time?” (“Statements”).  
 Much of the vetting and discussion of candidates had been done the year before. 
First Clinton asked Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, who had briefly been 
considered for White’s seat. Mitchell was working on getting Clinton’s health care 
legislation passed, and declined. So did Babbitt, who was still on the list. Clinton 
considered Richard Arnold, a friend and very well respected judge that he knew from his 
days in Arkansas. He had passed on Arnold the year before because he was afraid of 
controversies as it might look as a reward to a friend from his own state. But Arnold 
received praise from more than hundred federal judges who signed an unprecedented 
letter to Clinton recommending him (Toobin 77). Arnold had been diagnosed with 
cancer, and although otherwise healthy, Clinton understood that it would be a great risk. 
After going to the unusual step of contacting medical experts himself for a review of 
Arnold’s health, he moved on. Arnold died in 2004 (Lewis, “Richard S. Arnold”).  
 Supporters of Breyer had mobilized, and Clinton received a video tape of a speech 
where Breyer showed his humorous and sunny side, as the rumors about the interview the 
year before were well known. Senator Kennedy pushed for Breyer, and Republican Orrin 
Hatch told Clinton that Breyer would be acceptable (Lewis, “As”). On May 13, Clinton 
announced the nomination of Breyer in a televised press conference. Clinton was “eager 
to make the evening news,” according to Jeffrey Toobin, and did not wait for Breyer to 
arrive at the White House (Toobin 79). Clinton might have been eager to make the 
announcement as soon as possible considering the criticism he received during the 
Ginsburg nomination. This time, the nomination process had taken a little more than a 
month, and had been much less messy than the process that led up to Ginsburg’s 
nomination.  
 Breyer had a distinguished background. He was born in San Francisco in 1938, 
and after graduating from Harvard he served as a Watergate prosecutor, worked on 
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deregulating the airline industry, and was chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee (Margolick, “Scholarly”). The latter would earn him much praise in his 
hearings. As with Ginsburg, some liberals would worry about his ideological conviction. 
A colleague from Harvard stated that “Breyer’s basic social instincts are conservative” 
(ibid.). Republican Bob Dole was satisfied and stated that “[n]obody's going to lay a 
glove on him,” while Democratic Senator Howard Metzenbaum was worried and said 
that Breyer had “consistently favored corporate interests and a weakening of Government 
regulations” (Lewis, “In”). Law professor Alan Dershowitz imagined Breyer as a leader 
on the Court: “He's smarter than Scalia, but not nearly as bombastic” (Margolick).  
 In the hearings, Senator Hatch praised Breyer’s qualifications and even stated that 
he took “considerable comfort from Judge Breyer's overall record that he will resist the 
siren calls of judicial activism” (Breyer hearings, 10). Senator Kennedy used his 
testimony to ensure that the way he understood Breyer’s decisions, he would indeed 
uphold the rights to privacy and rule in favor of the underprivileged and the environment 
(Ibid. 12). Breyer, as Ginsburg, was very eager to explain himself and would often give 
long answers. The praise continued, and although questions like abortion and the death 
penalty were touched upon by Republicans, Breyer was never pressed for a specific 
answer. Republican Senator Strom Thurmond, who was 92 years old, was commended by 
his colleagues for having attended the hearings of 25% of all Supreme Court nominees in 
the history of the Court. Thurmond did not ask any follow-up of Breyer after a soft 
question about Roe v. Wade (Ibid. 36). He also praised Breyer for his service on the 
committee. Democratic Senator Carolyn Moseley-Braun asked for Breyer’s specific 
views on where the right to privacy originated. Breyer engaged in a short academic 
discussion of various amendments before dodging the core of the question by stating that 
since Planned Parenthood v. Casey reaffirmed Roe in 1992 he viewed Roe as “settled 
law” (Ibid. 236). Some criticism dealt with the fact that Breyer held a significant amount 
of stock, but he stated that he was willing to sell it when possible (Ibid 143). 
 Breyer soon found himself considered to be a part of the liberal wing of the Court, 
for many of the same reasons as Ginsburg. They proved to have similar philosophies, and 
neither was eager to be as activist as the liberals of the Warren Court. The fears over 
Breyer’s moderate reputation were generally unfounded as he, like Ginsburg, would vote 
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in favor of affirmative action and abortion rights. Breyer has been labeled a “one-case-at-
the-time pragmatist,” and when he in a book explained how he had an “attitude for 
interpreting the Constitution” instead of a textual approach, conservatives attacked him 
for lack of consistency (Greenburg 182). But this approach might also have helped 
convince moderate justices like O’Connor and Kennedy to join him.   
 
7.3 Conclusion 
If Clinton’s goal was to avoid controversy, he certainly succeeded. Much of Clinton’s 
presidency would be turbulent, but his Supreme Court appointments were successful 
from a Democratic point of view. Clinton had an ambivalent relationship with the media 
and early in his presidency he was highly skeptical of the coverage he received, as was 
demonstrated by his reaction to critical questions during the announcement of the 
Ginsburg nomination. 
After Breyer’s confirmation the Republicans took back Congress. At that point, 
Clinton’s mission with the Supreme Court was done, and the conservative backlash 
would not be able to influence the Court further. The remaining justices were relatively 
young considering what has been common on the Court, and further retirements were not 
expected during Clinton’s term. It was not until 2005 that the next vacancy would occur.  
Despite the fact that seven of the nine justices who served from 1994 to 2005 
were appointed by Republicans, liberals viewed the Court as “safe” regarding the 
abortion issue. The outgoing justices, White and Blackmun, arguably one conservative 
and one liberal, were replaced by two relatively moderate although liberal-leaning 
justices. Social conservatives realized that the fight to further influence the direction of 
the Court was lost for now, since they had not been able to overturn Roe v. Wade with a 
Court dominated by Republican appointees since the Nixon years.  
Both Ginsburg and Breyer are Jewish, and although questions of race and religion 
have often been discussed for earlier nominations, their ethnicity was not used to promote 
them in statements by Clinton. The last Jewish justice, Abe Fortas, had left the Court in 
1969 but there had been little pressure on Clinton to nominate any specific minority other 
than a woman. 
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The Court upheld Roe v. Wade in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992. It was 
viewed as a major victory by liberals, and Kennedy, Souter, and O’Connor voted to 
uphold the right to abortion. But during Clinton’s presidency, the Court reversed some of 
the federal regulation that had been permitted since the New Deal. In decisions like New 
York v. United States (1992), United States v. Lopez (1995), Prinz v. United States 
(1996), and United States v. Morrison et al. (2000), the Court struck down various laws 
that were based on the right of Congress to legislate matters that dealt with commerce 
between states. These decisions affected matters from nuclear waste disposal to gun 
control and affirmative action. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor provided support for 
several of these decisions (Moen 76). Although the social conservatives had little reason 
to be happy, those who were in favor of states’ rights and less federal intervention had 
achieved substantial victories.   
After their 1994 victories in Congress, Republicans took the fight to the lower 
courts. Since they controlled the committees, many of Clinton’s nominees were stalled 
infinitely. Unable to do something about the Supreme Court, Republicans would continue 
Reagan’s agenda to make the lower federal courts as conservative as possible. Clinton 
was pressed hard with Democrats in the minority and chose to avoid confrontation when 
Republicans raised protests against his nominees. Republicans campaigned against 
several nominees, singling out opinions they had written that they accused of being 
“activist.” Clinton, who consulted Republican Senator Orrin Hatch on most nominations, 
even withdrew and avoided nominating several qualified candidates to avoid showdowns 
in the Senate (Schwartz 144). Senator Paul Simon criticized his own president, stating 
that “we’re giving up fights too easily” (Ibid. 145). After Clinton’s reelection in 1997, 
Republicans resorted to letting nominations be delayed infinitely. For many nominations, 
no Judiciary Committee vote took place, and Senate Majority Leader, Republican Trent 
Lott, never scheduled any vote in the Senate (Ibid. 156). The federal judiciary had a 
record backlog of cases, and even Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the “growing 
number of vacancies was slowing the administration of justice and placing a burden on 
the courts” (Lewis, “Clinton”).  
In Clinton’s last two years in the White House, Republicans blocked 56% of 
Clinton’s circuit court nominees, anticipating a possible Republican victory in the 2000 
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presidential election. The numbers of blocked nominees for all federal judgeships were 
significantly higher during the Clinton years where Republicans were in the majority 
compared to the Reagan years where Democrats where in the majority (Schwartz 185). 
Under the next president Republicans would be just as firmly committed to the fight over 
the judiciary, but Democrats would resist fiercely.  
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8. George W. Bush 
 
George W. Bush was able to appoint two justices who shared his social conservative 
views: John Roberts and Samuel Alito. They replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O’Connor respectively. Roberts became Chief Justice and is young enough that his 
legacy will probably put a mark on the Court. Both of these appointments came during 
Bush’s second term and were largely uncontroversial, but between them the nomination 
of Harriet Miers failed. Bush’s two terms were in large part characterized by the terrorist 
attacks on New York City and Washington and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. But there 
was also a battle over the federal judiciary as Bush’s appointments to the lower federal 
courts caused great controversy. But maybe even more importantly, his appointment to 
the presidency was ensured by a decision in the Supreme Court. 
 The 2000 presidential election was not decided on election night. Despite the fact 
that Vice-President Al Gore had a lead in the popular vote, the outcome depended on who 
won a majority of votes in Florida. All of Florida’s votes in the Electoral College, which 
elects the president, would go to the winner of the state. Florida’s Secretary of State, 
Republican Katherine Harris, ordered a mandated recount of the votes to stop seven days 
after the election. The Florida Supreme Court ruled against her and ordered the recounts 
to continue (Toobin 148). Several lawsuits were filed back and forth between the parties, 
and the Supreme Court heard two cases, one on December 4, in which it held that the 
Florida Supreme Court could not let the recount continue until it justified the standards 
for how to do so, and another one on December 11 where it finally stopped another 
manual recount because, in justice Kennedy’s words, the standards for how ballots were 
considered in the recount did not provide “equal protection” for voters (Toobin 172). In 
the second case, the justices split along predictable ideological lines, with Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O’Connor in the majority, and Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, 
and Souter dissenting. Justice Stevens stated in his dissent: 
 
Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this 
year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s 
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law. (Bush v. Gore) 
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Later, both Kennedy and O’Connor admitted that the rushed majority opinion was not the 
“best effort” of the Court, although they are still committed to the result (Greenburg 175). 
Although both the decisions and the votes to take the cases were split among the 
perceived ideological lines on the Court, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
denied that there was an ideological divide (O’Brien 86). The battle over the election had 
been heated and unprecedented in the history of the United States, and a similarly heated 
battle would continue over judicial appointments in Bush’s first term. 
 While President Clinton had not been fully committed to pushing through his 
nominees for federal judgeships in the face of opposition, Bush was in a more favorable 
position as Republicans controlled the Senate from 2003 to 2007. They went on the 
offensive from the start. The very conservative John Ashcroft was appointed to Attorney 
General with an unprecedented 42 votes against him in the Senate, and the White House 
announced that the American Bar Association would no longer be given the names of 
possible nominees for screening despite the long standing tradition of doing so (Schwartz 
197).  
Faced with conservative nominees from Bush, the Democrats responded by 
denying the most controversial nominations a vote. To achieve this they effectively used 
a filibuster in which the Republicans would have to gather 60 votes in order to close the 
debate and vote on the nomination. While the Republicans under Clinton did not schedule 
hearings and votes on nominees, Democrats were now in the minority and did not control 
the committees. They had to use the filibuster to stall the president’s nominees. 
Republican leaders in turn threatened to end the practice of the filibuster, which they 
claimed they could do with a simple majority vote in the Senate. This was called the 
“nuclear option” and was a much debated topic in 2004 and 2005. Scholars and historians 
debated whether it would be legal or not. The filibuster was saved in 2005 by the “Gang 
of 14,” a group of senators from both parties who agreed to a document who would 
preserve the filibuster by voting together if necessary but at the same time reducing the 
usage of it on judicial appointments (Hulse). This allowed many of Bush’s nominees to 
take their seats.  
 On October 25, 2004, the Court announced that Chief Justice Rehnquist had been 
hospitalized for treatment of thyroid cancer. Speculation about the seriousness of the 
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disease started immediately as the presidential election was only two weeks away 
(Greenhouse, “Rehnquist Treated”). The Court’s statement did not provide much detail, 
and Rehnquist was away from the Court until March 2005 while working on opinions at 
home. Justice Stevens, the senior Associate Justice, led the oral arguments and 
conferences (Greenburg 9). At the time Justice O’Connor was considering leaving the 
Court because her husband had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. Among the 
justices there has traditionally been an understanding that two simultaneous vacancies 
should be avoided, as the public and the Senate should be able to give each nominee a 
thorough review. This was what O’Connor had in mind when she visited her old friend 
Rehnquist in June 2005. Rehnquist surprisingly said that he wanted to stay another year. 
O’Connor was then faced with two choices. One was leaving right away, since it was the 
end of the term and the Senate would need the time before the next term to consider a 
nominee. The other was staying on for another two years. She had been prepared to stay 
one more year, as she and most others assumed the visibly weakened Rehnquist would 
retire (Greenburg 20). But she was not left with much choice after hearing Rehnquist’s 
response.  
 
8.1 John G. Roberts (2005) – Chief Justice 
Most Supreme Court observers had assumed that Rehnquist would retire at the end of the 
term, and there was widespread surprise when O’Connor resigned in a letter to President 
Bush on July 1, 2005. Bush had won reelection the year before with a reinvigorated 
social conservative movement behind him. The Court had not changed in composition 
since 1994, a new record in the time the Court had had nine members. Conservatives 
were also watching the 85-year old Stevens and the cancer-stricken Rehnquist. The 
possibility of shaping the Court for decades to come was very real. With the surprise 
retirement of a centrist like O’Connor, the balance of the Court was suddenly in play in a 
way it would not have been had Rehnquist retired. Democrats’ options remained few as 
they were in the minority in the Senate, and the “gang of 14” had contributed to a higher 
threshold for filibustering judicial nominations. But Republicans were also surprised by 
O’Connor’s retirement. C. Boyden Gray, the former counsel for the first President Bush 
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during his Supreme Court nominations, stated in an interview with the New York Times: 
“I'm not sure we are as prepared for an O'Connor vacancy” (Stevenson, “O’Connor”). 
Replacing a moderate female justice would be different than replacing the ailing 
Rehnquist. 
 Conservatives were generally not worried about Bush’s level of commitment to 
appointing conservative judges. But in the days following O’Connor’s retirement there 
were concerted efforts to discourage Bush from nominating one man, his trusted advisor 
through many years and now Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales. Gonzales had served 
on the Texas Supreme Court before Bush brought him along to Washington as a White 
House counsel. Among conservatives he was viewed with suspicion since his record was 
not substantial enough to ensure that he was committed to their causes. Activists Paul 
Weyrich and Phyllis Schlafly, along with columnist Robert Novak, let it be known 
immediately after O’Connor’s retirement that Gonzales should not be considered (Toobin 
267). Justice Souter was used as an example of the risk of nominating someone with an 
ambiguous conservative record.  
 Bush was prepared for a vacancy and already in May 2005 the White House team 
had interviewed several possible candidates (Ibid. 273). Among the people in the team 
were Vice-President Dick Cheney, Attorney General Gonzales, White House Chief of 
Staff Andrew Card, strategist Karl Rove, and White House Counsel Harriet Miers 
(Stolberg, “Court”). Compared to earlier presidents, Bush’s interviewing team consisted 
of more people and higher level people.  
Several candidates were interviewed. J. Michael Luttig, a judge on the Fourth 
Circuit Court who had worked at the Justice Department and was part of the team that 
had screened nominees for the older President Bush, was considered. He fit the profile, as 
he was reliably conservative, only 50 years old, and had previously been a clerk for 
Justice Scalia. J. Harvie Wilkinson, also on the Fourth Circuit Court, was considered well 
fit for the role as chief, but he was 60 years old and would probably have a shorter tenure 
(Ibid.). Samuel Alito, 55, had served on the Third Circuit Court since 1990. He was 
favored by William Kelley, Harriet Miers’ deputy. Kelley had not been able to find any 
opinions by Alito that he disagreed with. Miers also liked Alito’s “quiet confidence” and 
the fact that he had seemed less interested in positioning himself for the job than Luttig 
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(Greenburg 294). Edith Brown Clement, a judge on the Fifth Circuit Court, was also 
interviewed but was not considered a front-runner. She was not well known for anything 
except her conservative views, and the team assumed she was on the list because Bush 
wanted a woman there (Ibid.). Miguel Estrada, a Hispanic who had been nominated for 
the D.C. Circuit Court but blocked by Democrats, refused to go through the confirmation 
process again (Ibid. 198). 
Of the people on Bush’s list John Roberts may have had the most impressive 
reputation. He was well liked by both liberals and conservatives and was considered one 
of the best lawyers to argue before the Supreme Court. He had clerked for Rehnquist and 
had worked in the Reagan and Bush administrations, but when he was nominated for the 
D.C. Circuit Court at the end of Bush’s last term in 1992, the Democrats never allowed a 
vote on the nomination. He was re-nominated in 2001 by the younger Bush, but the 
Democrats stalled the nomination until 2003 when he finally received the seat (Schwartz 
102, 245). At 50, he was in a good position to serve for a long time should he be chosen 
for the Supreme Court.  
Roberts did not do well in his interview. The team was constrained by the fact that 
they could not ask about specific cases, and Robert’s generalized answers were not as 
reassuring as they had hoped for (Greenburg 193). In addition, Harriet Miers, who had 
come with Bush from Texas to Washington, was not convinced by the Washington 
insiders who told her to trust Roberts (Toobin 275). Bush’s choices had boiled down to 
Robert and Luttig. Miers favored Luttig, but was willing to listen to several of the 
insiders who approved of Roberts, including Ed Meese and C. Boyden Gray (Ibid. 276). 
After O’Connor’s resignation, on July 15, 2005, Bush interviewed Roberts himself. The 
timing was lucky for Roberts, as the D.C. Circuit Court on the same day approved of 
Bush’s use of military tribunals for the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, with Roberts in the 
majority. Cheney and Miers were convinced (Ibid. 277). 
Robert’s nomination was announced on a televised prime-time news conference 
on July 19, 2005. He was praised as having “enormous skills” and for being fair minded 
by both liberal and conservative lawyers, and the New York Times stated that he “was 
clearly among the less provocative picks Mr. Bush could have made” (Purdum, “In”). 
The day after, Republicans in the Gang of 14 said that a filibuster would not be justified, 
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and the nomination seemed to be safe (Toobin 278). O’Connor was very excited about 
Roberts, whom she really liked, but she was disappointed by the fact that Bush did not 
nominate a woman (Ibid. 213). Roberts began preparing for the hearings that were 
scheduled to start on September 6. Liberal and conservative activists began their 
campaigns and dug through Robert’s past in search of hints regarding his views. 
Documents from his time at the Justice Department in the early 1980s were released by 
the National Archives. He had argued for several conservative causes, opposing the 
expansion of the Voting Rights Act, argued for judicial restraint, and opposed affirmative 
action (Stolberg, “Court”). These statements failed to make any significant impact, 
possibly because it was argued that he only had promoted the official views of the 
administration. Both in the media and in private meetings with senators Roberts fared 
well and no greater scandals surfaced (Greenburg 238). 
On September 3, 2005, Chief Justice Rehnquist died in his home in Virginia. 
Although the speculation about his health had been ongoing since the announcement of 
his cancer, the news media had largely dropped the subject when he had not resigned at 
the end of the previous term. The news came just as the Hurricane Katrina unfolded, a 
catastrophe which turned out to cost more lives than any natural disaster in modern 
American history.  
Bush had to act quickly in case that he wanted to nominate Robert for Chief 
Justice, since the hearings were to start on September 6. There had been an ongoing 
conservative campaign for Justice Scalia as Chief Justice, as he was perceived as a 
dedicated fighter for judicial restraint against liberal activists (Toobin 280). But Scalia 
was 69 years old, and there was the potential of a filibuster or even a bigger fight over 
abolishing the filibuster in the Senate. Thomas was another justice that Bush admired but 
he was considered even more controversial. The remaining justices were not committed 
enough to be considered, and conservatives also would have disapproved of elevating any 
of them to Chief. Outside the Court, several of the candidates considered for O’Connor’s 
seat were vetted for Chief. But Roberts was chosen over the more controversial Luttig 
and the older Wilkinson. Roberts had made a very good case for himself since his 
nomination for Associate Justice and he was presumed to be confirmed for that seat 
(Greenburg 242). In a press conference on September 5, Bush nominated Roberts for 
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Chief Justice and referred to how well the Senate and the American people had received 
Roberts (Stevenson, “President”). 
The first hearing for a Supreme Court Justice in eleven years began on September 
12. The Democrats focused on what they viewed as the high stakes. Senator Joe Biden 
framed the question that captured the minds of many senators:  
 
For 70 years, there's been a consensus, Judge, on our Supreme Court on these issues of 
privacy and protecting the powerless. And this consensus has been fully, fully embraced, 
in my view, by the American people. But there are those who strongly disagree with the 
consensus, as is their right. And they seek to unravel the consensus.… And quite frankly, 
Judge, we need to know on which side of that divide you stand, for whoever replaces 
Justice Rehnquist, as well as Justice O'Connor, will play a pivotal role in this debate and 
for tens of millions of the American people, this is no academic exercise. For the position 
you will take in this debate will affect their lives in very real and personal ways for at 
least, God willing, the next three decades. And there is nothing they can do about it after 
this moment. (Roberts hearings) 
 
Roberts had prepared well for the hearings. He was not willing to go into specifics. In 
line with the conservative skepticism to judicial activism, but in neutral terms, he 
characterized his own role as that of an umpire: “Umpires don't make the rules; they 
apply them” (ibid.). He went on to ensure the senators about his lack of agenda: 
 
I have no platform.… I have no agenda, but I do have a commitment. If I am confirmed, I 
will confront every case with an open mind. I will fully and fairly analyze the legal 
arguments that are presented. I will be open to the considered views of my colleagues on 
the bench. And I will decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of law, 
without fear or favor, to the best of my ability. (Ibid.) 
 
His evasiveness became the subject of criticism and even cartoons in newspapers. Yet 
Roberts impressed senators with his detailed knowledge of old cases, and he even cited 
the Federalist Papers from memory. Asked by Senator Specter about Roe v. Wade, he was 
uncommitted, stating that it was “settled as a precedent of the court” but at the same time 
made it clear that decisions are sometimes reversed (Toobin 281). Democratic Senator 
Edward Kennedy announced that he was not convinced and stated: “I hope I am proved 
(sic) wrong about John Roberts.” Democratic Senator Charles Schumer of New York 
made it clear that the real battle was ahead: “The curtain is about to rise on the 
nomination of a replacement for Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.… If ever there was a time 
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that cried out for consensus, the time is now” (Stout, “Roberts”). The Judiciary 
Committee sent him to the Senate with a vote of 13-5 on September 22. Several senators 
went on the record with how they would vote, and it appeared that Roberts had a safe 
margin and the support of many Democrats. Senator Hillary Clinton, although opposing 
Roberts and possibly positioning herself for the 2008 election, acknowledged Robert’s 
qualifications: “My desire to maintain the already fragile Supreme Court majority for 
civil rights, voting rights and women's rights outweighs the respect I have for Judge 
Roberts's intellect, character and legal skills” (Stolberg, “Panel”). 
Roberts was confirmed as the seventeenth Chief Justice of the United States on 
September 29 by a 78-22 vote, a bigger margin than his predecessor. Later the same day 
he was sworn in by the Senior Justice, John Paul Stevens. 
 
8.2 Harriet Miers (2005) 
On October 3 Bush nominated White House counsel Harriet Miers to replace Justice 
O’Connor. The choice surprised both conservatives and liberals. The only hint Bush had 
dropped was a statement the week before where he had said that “diversity is one of the 
strengths of the country” (Williams, “Bush”). O’Connor and the First Lady had also 
stated that they preferred a woman (Toobin 282). Compared to the relatively easy time 
Roberts had had after his nomination, Miers would fare a lot worse, and the contrast 
between how the two nominations were handled was quite remarkable. 
 After O’Connor retired, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card had asked 
Miers if she wanted to be considered. She had declined and was put in charge of 
administering the search for a nominee (Toobin 284). She was probably considered 
mostly because of her gender, as the list of women and minority candidates was relatively 
short. But people on Bush’s team knew her as a hard-working and dedicated woman, and 
thought those qualities could serve her well on the Court. In addition they trusted her 
conservative credentials despite her lack of judicial experience. But since she took herself 
out of consideration, the search for a well qualified candidate who was not a white male 
continued through the Roberts nomination and his confirmation.  
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 There were few women on Bush’s list, and most of them would have trouble 
getting confirmed. Edith Clement, who had been considered before Rehnquist died, was 
not as respected as Roberts. Janice Rogers Brown and Edith Jones were both appealing 
but had been filibustered by the Democrats when nominated for lower courts. There were 
just not many conservative women candidates who could pass as qualified (Toobin 285). 
As for the Hispanic alternatives, Estrada still declined, and Bush had realized that 
Gonzales would not convince social conservatives. Andrew Card realized the limited 
options and had decided to research Miers. He asked her deputy William Kelley to do a 
background search of her, similar to what was done regarding other candidates. As is 
pointed out in Greenburg’s book, the quality of secret advice from a subordinate in the 
position of reviewing his boss is questionable (Greenburg 249). During a dinner at the 
White House on September 21 Democrat and Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid had 
suggested Miers to Bush, saying that ”[i]f you nominate Harriet Miers, you’ll start with 
fifty-six votes.” Reid had worked with Miers preparing for Robert’s nomination and had 
come to respect her (Greenburg 256). At the time Republicans held 55 seats in the 
Senate. Leonard Leo of the Federalist Society was asked about Miers, but he did not 
consider her candidacy very likely, so he did not object other than questioning the lack of 
a judicial record (Toobin 288). But the Bush team already had an answer for that. Bush 
knew her very well and both he and the rest of the vetting team were sure of her 
allegiance to conservatism. In their view, she would not be another Souter. 
 Miers had lived her whole life in Texas before Bush brought her to Washington. 
She had been partner at a major law firm and president of the State Bar, the first woman 
who had served in both positions. Bush had also appointed her to the chair of the Texas 
Lottery Commission while he was governor (Williams, “Bush”). She had never been a 
judge, which was unusual for recent nominees. Clinton had wanted to appoint a non-
judge in order to get new perspectives on the Court but had not been able to. Bush had 
now made an unusual choice, as the candidate was both a woman and had no experience 
from the bench. Bush and Miers had another thing in common: They were both born-
again Christians. In her 30s, Miers, who was raised a Catholic, had had a spiritual 
awakening and joined an evangelical church in Texas (Wyatt, “In”). Her trusted 
relationship with the president and their shared experiences of joining Evangelical 
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movement late in their lives may have led Bush towards choosing her. Gonzales was 
skeptical and had been warned by associates in the Justice Department that her 
nomination would not be received well by conservatives. He visited Bush just before the 
nomination to raise the concerns. But Bush felt assured that conservatives would be more 
positive toward Miers than they had been toward the prospect of a Gonzales nomination, 
even though Gonzales argued they would not (Greenburg 267). 
In his nomination speech, Bush told conservatives to trust him on Miers’ views: 
“I’ve known Harriet for more than a decade. I know her heart, I know her character” 
(Toobin 289). The assurances failed to convince the most vocal activists, who were the 
ones Bush had hoped to appease. The lack of supporters for Miers was very evident in the 
first few days. Only a few spoke out in favor of her. However, Republican Senator Orrin 
Hatch on the Judiciary Committee was convinced: “A lot of my fellow conservatives are 
concerned, but they don't know her as I do” (Stout, “Bush”). Democratic Senator Harry 
Reid praised her, but did not officially endorse her (Williams, “Bush”). Two judges who 
had known her were put forward by the Bush team as witnesses regarding her character, 
and they vouched for her in the media (Toobin 291). But what they had in common was 
the fact that they knew her and had worked with her. To most observers she was 
unknown, and conservative skepticism would only rise. Conservative activists like Rush 
Limbaugh, Laura Ingraham, David Frum, and Bill Kristol all criticized the choice during 
the first days after her nomination (Greenburg 271). The common theme was that she 
might be conservative, but they would only settle for someone who was reliably 
conservative and whose views were well known to replace the swing vote of O’Connor. 
A Souter or a Kennedy would not be acceptable this time. 
 The nomination hearings were scheduled to start on November 7, which gave 
Miers less time to prepare than Roberts had had. She was also doing badly in her 
preparations, since she was not used to discussing constitutional law and unfamiliar with 
being questioned. The idea of withdrawing her nomination was discussed, but Andrew 
Card insisted that she would improve (Greenburg 279). The confusion continued. James 
Dobson, the powerful head of the evangelical group Focus on the Family, said that he had 
knowledge that made him sure that Miers would be a good Justice (Kirkpatrick, 
“Endorsement”). Senator Arlen Specter, a moderate pro-choice Republican and leader of 
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the Judiciary Committee, had gotten the impression from Miers that she indeed would let 
Roe v. Wade stand, and considered calling Dobson to testify (Ibid.) (Greenburg 280). On 
October 19, Specter, in partnership with the ranking Democratic member on the Judiciary 
Committee, submitted a questionnaire to Miers and the White House where they asked 
for clarifications of her views and her role in the Bush White House. They found her 
response unsatisfying and resubmitted the questions stating in unusually strong language 
that her responses were “"inadequate," "insufficient," and "insulting"” (Kirkpatrick, 
“Court”). At the opposite side of the political spectrum, Republican Senators Lindsey 
Graham and Sam Brownback wrote a request for more information from the White 
House, but with a different goal. 
 The exit strategy was proposed by conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer 
in a column on October 21 in the Washington Post. He suggested that the requests for 
information from the White House jeopardized executive privilege and that the president 
could not release the information that was requested (Krauthammer, “The”). Card and 
Bush understood the situation and Card, who had been a strong supporter of Miers, told 
her that it would not work (Greenburg 284). She resigned in a letter written to Bush on 
October 27, stating the reasons Krauthammer suggested. She also included the following 
statement: “I share your commitment to appointing judges with a conservative judicial 
philosophy,” possibly as a message to her critics (Miers). 
 Compared to the Roberts nomination, Miers’ nomination had been a disaster. 
Bush had not anticipated the conservative backlash or their lack of confidence in his 
assurances. The lack of qualified and non-controversial minority candidates had left him 
with little choice but to nominate Miers. The demand for a minority or woman candidate 
had been strong in both liberal and conservative camps, and Bush was probably wise to 
pursue it. But when left with no other alternatives than Miers, he had underestimated the 
force of the social conservative movement that had helped him get re-elected. They 
needed to be assured that she would not be another Souter or Kennedy, or even an 
O’Connor. Republican presidents had used up their mistakes quota, and Bush would have 
to deliver. Since O’Connor was confirmed in 1981 the rules had changed. The 
conservative movement was now able to set the premises. 
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8.3 Samuel Alito (2005) 
On October 31, President Bush nominated Alito for O’Connor’s seat. Bush stated that 
Alito “has more prior judicial experience than any Supreme Court nominee in more than 
70 years” (Bumiller, “Bush”). Alito’s background made a stark contrast to Miers. His 
nomination was announced only four days after the withdrawal of Harriet Miers. Bush 
had spent the weekend at Camp David, following the indictment of Lewis “Scooter” 
Libby, Cheney’s Chief of Staff over the CIA leak investigation where the name of an 
agent had been made public. Miers was back at her job researching nominees, and this 
time she had her way. There was little debate over the candidates, as only Luttig and 
Alito were considered seriously. Both Bush and Miers liked Alito more (Toobin 298). 
Alito also had the advantage of being potentially less controversial than Luttig, and Bush 
did not need any more controversy even though this time the critics were likely to be the 
Democrats. The failed Miers nomination had given Bush the opportunity to appoint a 
white conservative male against fewer protests than he would probably have received had 
Alito been his first choice.  
 Alito, who came from and still lived in New Jersey, had served on the Third 
Circuit Court since 1990. His resume was impressive: He had attended Princeton and 
Yale and and served as assistant to the solicitor general under Reagan, before he took his 
seat on the circuit court. Most troubling to liberals, Alito had dissented when the abortion 
case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey had come before his court in 1991. He had not 
wanted to strike down the spousal notification portion of the law (Bumiller, “Bush”). The 
Supreme Court later struck it down, and O’Connor’s opinion criticized the notification as 
“repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights 
secured by the Constitution. Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty 
when they marry” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey). One may assume that O’Connor was 
more skeptical of Alito’s nomination than of Robert’s.  
 The reactions were fairly predictable: Democrats raised questions about his views, 
while Republicans and conservative groups praised him. Senator Patrick Leahy from 
Vermont, who was the ranking Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, called the 
nomination a “needlessly provocative nomination” and accused Bush of trying to cater to 
the conservatives that had brought Miers down (Bumiller, “Bush”). The hearings were 
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scheduled to begin on January 9, 2006, more than two months after the announcement, 
which gave both sides time to prepare. In national news, however, the CIA leak case and 
the aftermath after hurricane Katrina still dominated. In December tensions rose as a 
document from Alito’s time in the Reagan administration was released. Alito had argued 
for several strategies to weaken Roe v. Wade. Conservatives came to his defense saying 
that he had been arguing on behalf of the government. The Alliance for Justice, a liberal 
advocacy groups, stated that the problems with Alito ranged from civil rights to police 
searches, and that abortion was only one of many issues (Hulse, “After”). Democrats 
hinted at the possible use of the filibuster, although they knew it would be difficult. Arlen 
Specter, the moderate Republican from Pennsylvania, said there was “no basis” for a 
filibuster (ibid.). 
 Senator Specter began the hearings by addressing the abortion question in his 
statement to the Committee. He stated: “This hearing will give Judge Alito the public 
forum to address the issue, as he has with senators in private meetings, that his personal 
views and prior advocacy will not determine his judicial decision, but instead, he will 
weigh factors such as stare decisis” (Senate Confirmation Hearings - Day 1, 2). Specter, 
who wished to avoid a filibuster, wanted Alito to reassure senators that he would respect 
settled law. Again the underlying theme seemed to be abortion rights, which Specter 
supported. Following Specter, Senator Leahy’s statement noted concerns for Alito’s 
views on executive powers, civil rights, and privacy. He called the document Alito had 
written for the Reagan administration “disturbing” (Ibid. 4).  
Senator Kennedy was also critical and asked Alito about his membership in a 
conservative organization at Princeton called “Concerned Alumni of Princeton.” The 
organization was very conservative, and in Kennedy’s words its views were “anti-
woman, anti-black, anti-disability, anti-gay” (Senate Confirmation Hearings: Day 4, 12).  
Alito explained that he was not much involved with the organization and had only joined 
because it had supported the right of the military to recruit on campus (Toobin 316). 
Kennedy also criticized Alito’s views on executive powers. He closed by stating: “[I]n 
case after case, we see legal contortions and inconsistent reasoning to bend over 
backward to help the powerful. He may cite instances to think that he helped the little 
guy, but the records clear that the average person has a hard time getting a fair shake in 
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Judge Alito’s courtroom” (Senate Confirmation Hearings: Day 4, 12). The New York 
Times, in an editorial called “Judge Alito’s Radical Views,” opposed his confirmation 
stating: “If the far right takes over the Supreme Court, American law and life could 
change dramatically.” The editorial went on to contrast his views to the pragmatic centrist 
views of Justice O’Connor. On January 31, 2006 the Senate voted to confirm Alito by 58-
42, the closest margin since the confirmation of Clarence Thomas. Only four Democrats 
voted for Alito (Stout, “Alito”). 
Compared to Miers, Alito had completely different qualifications. He was a white 
male and had served as a judge for a long time. His opinions were conservative and 
conservatives immediately approved of him. The failed Miers nomination probably made 
his confirmation easier. There had been a very strong effort both from Bush, the media, 
Democrats, and several commentators to appoint a woman or a member of a minority 
group. But the number of such candidates with enough conservative credentials was 
limited. After Miers the criticism against Alito was mostly about his views, not his 
ethnicity or gender. In some ways, the situation was comparable to Anthony Kennedy’s 
nomination. Kennedy followed two failed candidates, and there was no appetite for a 
fight anymore. However, this time Alito followed a candidate whose conservative 
credentials were called into questions, not the other way around. Kennedy had been 
confirmed because he was not as unapologetically conservative as Bork. In 2005, with a 
Republican majority in the Senate, Alito was the “safe” candidate. And this time the 
conservative movement was satisfied. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
At the time of writing, Roberts and Alito have served for three years and both have 
generally lived up to conservatives’ expectations. Bush can probably be content that his 
legacy on the Supreme Court is two reliably conservative votes. As with Clinton’s 
nominees, none of them has turned out to drift away from the block they were expected 
to belong to. Had Bush’s failed nominee, Harriet Miers, been confirmed, she would 
probably have been watched more carefully for any signs of not being conservative. The 
reason that Miers was considered in the first place was the strong public pressure to 
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nominate a woman or a member of a racial minority. With few qualified candidates that 
were women or minorities, Bush had ended up with Miers. The failure of the Miers 
nomination dampened the pressure to name someone from those groups. This allowed 
Bush to consider white males, which was the pool in which there were the most 
candidates with unambiguous conservative records.  
The conservative movement, which generally was very approving of Bush, would 
not accept his personal assurances. They needed to see proof that they would not get 
another justice that would drift toward the center or left wing. The Bush administration 
lost some major cases, proving that a Court with seven justices appointed by Republicans 
would not rubberstamp Bush’s controversial usage of executive powers. Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush were decided against the administration and in favor 
of the rights of the detainees at Guantanamo to get their cases heard before federal courts. 
At the same time, the Rehnquist Court had been successful in rolling back some of the 
New Deal precedents that had allowed for Congress and the federal government to 
regulate matters of commerce between states. Conservatives could be relatively satisfied 
about their agenda to diminish federal intervention in matters like affirmative action, gun 
control, and environmental regulation by giving more power to the states (Moen 76). The 
new appointees were likely to pursue this just as strongly. 
Despite the humiliation of the Miers nomination Bush ended with two solid 
conservative appointments. Chief Justice Roberts, praised for his intellect and skill by 
liberals and conservatives alike, will probably be the symbol of the judicial branch for 
many years to come. Justice Alito, replacing the pragmatic O’Connor, has further turned 
the Court toward the right. The failed Miers nomination turned out to make it easier for 
Bush to nominate a “safe” conservative candidate.  
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9. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this concluding section is to use the trends identified in the discussion of 
individual nominations to draw general conclusions considering the various factors which 
decide how a nominee is chosen and whether the nomination succeeds or fails. Some 
trends are easy to see, while others are harder to identify since there are only twenty 
nominations. The categories used are not mutually exclusive and several of them overlap 
to some extent. The last two categories, dealing with qualifications and controversies, 
will try to establish to which extent those two factors can explain how a nomination turns 
out. As observed in the introduction, several presidents have not been afraid of 
nominating candidates with weak qualifications or a clear record of ideological 
commitment. Though there are well-known examples of the failures of such candidates, it 
is useful to investigate to what extent they succeed in this period and why they are 
nominated. 
 
9.1 Timing 
Nine of the twenty nominations were announced in the period from May to July, after the 
Court had heard its last arguments of the term and in time before its next term began in 
October. When justices retire in good health and not for reasons that have made their 
departure immediately required, they usually choose to retire at the end of a term. They 
also try to avoid more than one retirement per term, to further ease the work of the 
president and the Senate in replacing them. However, roughly half of the nominations in 
this thesis were announced during the term. There appears to be two main reasons for 
this. Firstly, there was a relatively high rate of failed nominations. In the period covered 
in this thesis five of twenty nominations failed and nominations following them were 
usually announced in the fall. Secondly, the fact that many justices serve until they are at 
an advanced age makes sudden retirements for health reasons or death more likely. 
When justices died or resigned abruptly, as in the cases of Fortas, Black, Harlan, 
Douglas, and Rehnquist, nominees to replace them were announced during the Court’s 
term or shortly before it began. In the cases of nominees following failed candidates – 
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like Carswell, Blackmun, D. Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Alito – nominations also occurred 
during the term.  
Nominations at the end of a president’s term are at risk of being delayed by a 
partisan Senate. When Chief Justice Earl Warren retired and President Johnson 
nominated Abe Fortas to replace him, Republicans successfully stalled the nomination 
until after the presidential election so President Nixon could appoint his replacement. 
There were similar fears regarding Democratic action during Reagan’s unsuccessful 
nominations of Bork and D. Ginsburg.  
The fact that the Court’s work is severely hindered by the absence of one or more 
justices does not seem to accelerate the process or favor nominees’ chances. In two of the 
three cases where the first nominee failed, the second nominee also failed. These cases 
were Haynsworth and Carswell, and Bork and D. Ginsburg, respectively. In the other 
case of a failed nomination, that of Harriett Miers, the next nominee was confirmed. The 
data sample is very small, but it does suggest that senators value other factors more than 
the Court’s immediate practical concerns when evaluating a nominee.  
 
9.2 Diversity on the Court 
When replacing a justice of a certain ideology, religious affiliation, or ethnicity there has 
often been an expectation that diversity should be maintained. Initially there was an 
emphasis on geographic diversity, but in the twentieth century the mentioned 
characteristics became a matter of concern. 
With the retirements of Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first African-American on 
the Court, and Justice O’Connor, the first woman on the Court, presidents felt obliged to 
nominate similar candidates. Both George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush suffered 
from low approval ratings at the time of the nominations. The elder Bush chose Clarence 
Thomas, hoping that his racial affiliation would provide enough support to get him 
confirmed despite his well-known and very conservative views. George W. Bush chose 
Harriet Miers, hoping that she would be confirmed because of her gender and the widely 
expressed sentiment that there should be another woman on the Court. Both presidents 
got into trouble for their choices: Thomas was confirmed by a razor-thin margin, and 
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Miers had to withdraw because her qualifications were seriously questioned. Yet at the 
same time, both presidents started out with a difficult situation since there were few 
candidates that fit the diversity criteria and had relevant qualifications and conservative 
views. There were plenty of well-qualified white males to choose among, but such a 
choice might have reflected badly on the presidents.  
 The pressure on presidents to ensure a balance on the Court varies with the 
circumstances. When the Miers nomination failed, both the president and the public were 
more focused on getting the seat filled than nominating another woman. When Abe 
Fortas had to resign from the Court because of media scrutiny of his financial dealings, 
there was little pressure on Nixon to maintain a “Jewish seat.” Some expectations do not 
relate directly to the outgoing justice but to the balance of the Court. Nixon considered 
women for his appointments, and the expectations continued until Reagan announced that 
he would appoint one. When Reagan nominated Antonin Scalia, a point was made that he 
was Italian-American and a Catholic. When Bush nominated Samuel Alito, there were 
already four Catholics on the Court, and his Italian-American heritage received much less 
attention than Scalia’s.  
There are at the time of writing expectations of President Obama to name another 
non-white justice. Most frequently suggested is a Hispanic candidate since Hispanics are 
a significant minority group with no representation on the current Court. There is also a 
strong pressure to nominate another woman as there is currently only one on the Court. 
This will influence the president’s options to some degree and make it harder for him not 
to fulfill at least one of those criteria. The situation is not unusual, since all the presidents 
in the period covered in this thesis faced some expectations regarding gender and 
ethnicity. 
 
9.3 Ideology 
The ideology of the outgoing justice influences the president’s options in choosing a 
replacement. If the retiring justice is perceived to share the president’s ideology, there is 
likely to be little controversy over the nomination of a well-qualified similar candidate. 
George W. Bush replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist with the well-qualified and 
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conservative John Roberts, and the confirmation was not considered to be in danger. 
Similarly, Bill Clinton replaced the liberal Harry Blackmun with Stephen Breyer, 
considered a moderate to liberal judge at the time.  
The possibility for conflict increases significantly when a centrist justice retires, 
and the replacement is perceived to be liberal or conservative. Robert Bork’s nomination 
was defeated because of concerns that his views would tilt the Court sharply towards the 
right since he would have replaced the moderate Lewis Powell. Similarly, Samuel Alito 
was criticized heavily by Democrats and liberals because he was considered far to the 
right of Justice O’Connor whom he replaced. Senators can get into trouble for stating that 
they vote with the ideological balance of the Court in mind; yet the voting patterns shows 
that it happens. Democrat and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Joseph 
Biden, who had earlier spoken of Bork as a well-qualified conservative, changed his 
position when Bork was nominated since he thought the Court would become too 
conservative. He stated that “while Judge Bork was ‘a brilliant man,’ that did not mean 
‘hat there should be six or seven or eight, or even nine Borks’ on the Court” (Noble, 
“Biden”). Republicans criticized his change of mind and accused him of not doing his job 
fairly. 
A nominee that is considered to be moderate, or not outright ideological, has a 
good chance of replacing a moderate justice. Sandra Day O’Connor was confirmed by a 
99-0 vote when she replaced Potter Stewart, and Anthony Kennedy was confirmed by 97-
0 when he eventually replaced Lewis Powell after the failed nominations of Robert Bork 
and Douglas Ginsburg. A moderate nominee, or in some cases more moderate than a 
previous failed nominee, also has a good chance of replacing a clearly liberal or 
conservative justice. Blackmun replaced Fortas, Stevens replaced Douglas, and Souter 
replaced Brennan, all with 89 or more votes.  
When a nominee is presented who is perceived to hold a different ideological 
position than the retiring justice, there is usually some amount of conflict. Nixon failed to 
replace the liberal Fortas with conservatives Haynsworth and Carswell and eventually 
had to settle for Blackmun who was less ideological. Souter and Thomas, both nominated 
by George H. W. Bush, were criticized by liberals since they were replacing liberal icons 
Brennan and Marshall. In the nominations covered, there are only two examples of a 
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justice being confirmed that turn out to have an ideology widely at variance with the 
predecessor. Chief Justice Burger, a conservative, replaced the liberal Chief Justice 
Warren. Thomas, also a conservative, replaced the liberal icon Marshall. Arguably, the 
replacement of White with R. B. Ginsburg was also a shift of ideology, although not as 
dramatic as the other two since White was not easily categorized. Thomas was confirmed 
by a very thin margin, while Burger was nominated by Richard Nixon who had just taken 
office after Lyndon Johnson had failed to replace Warren with Fortas. At the time 
Democrats were demoralized and had little motivation to fight against Burger.  
One irregularity in this pattern is the nomination of Harriet Miers. Little was 
known about her views, other than the fact that Bush tried to ensure his conservative base 
that he knew “her heart.” The Senate Minority Leader, Democrat Harry Reid, thought 
highly of her from working with her on judicial nominations and ensured Bush that he 
would support her. Several Democrats might also have been likely to vote for her 
confirmation since she was a woman, hoping that she might turn out to vote like 
O’Connor. She might also have been the best they could hope for from a Republican 
president. What stopped Miers’ nomination was a conservative uproar. Controlling the 
presidency and Congress, and having ensured a deal that lessened the risk of a filibuster, 
emboldened conservatives now demanded that O’Connor be replaced by a nominee who 
was fully committed to conservatism and would tilt the Court toward the right. This fact 
testifies to the growth and increased influence of the conservative movement since their 
stern warnings to Reagan regarding his nomination of O’Connor.  
The liberal justices currently on the Court are either Republican appointees in the 
cases of Stevens and Souter, or were perceived to be moderate at the time of their 
appointment in the cases of R. B. Ginsburg and Breyer. They are not as consistently 
liberal as earlier liberals like Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan.  
Despite conservatives’ mistrust of the ideology of potential nominees who are not 
outspoken conservatives, few of the justices have made ideological turnarounds 
compared to what was expressed at the Senate hearings. The cases of Blackmun, Stevens, 
Kennedy, and Souter are often cited to prove how justices may surprise the presidents 
after appointment. However, few of them revealed anything but a moderate attitude in 
their hearings and in their background. Both Blackmun and Kennedy were chosen for 
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their less conservative record than the two failed ideological nominees before each of 
them. Laurence Tribe discusses the “myth of the surprised president”, and argues that 
presidents had little reason to be surprised after choosing candidates with less known 
track records (92).  
A future president replacing a justice with a candidate of a different ideological 
stance should expect it to be a tough battle. The polarization of American politics is not a 
new phenomenon, but during the last decades it has affected judicial nominations in an 
increasing degree. Jeffrey Toobin argues that “[t]oday, the fundamental divisions in 
American society are not regional or religious, but ideological.” He claims that 
conservatives “cared more about the Court than their liberal counterparts” (338). 
Nominees put forth by Republicans have in several of the nominations been viewed 
critically not only by liberals but also by conservatives. The demands of a sufficient 
convincing ideological affiliation have also come from conservatives. As argued by 
Moen and Schwartz, the most conservative justices have in the last decades been able to 
undo some of the Warren Court precedent regarding federal authority and regulation. 
There are more conservative justices now on the Court than during the reigns of 
Warren and Burger, and those justices are also more consistently conservative and 
ideologically rigid.  
 
9.4 The President’s Involvement 
There has been a varying degree of involvement by the president in choosing a nominee. 
Clinton, the only Democratic president to appoint justices in the period covered, spent 
much time studying the candidates. The involvement of Nixon, George H. W. Bush, and 
George W. Bush varied. Ford and Reagan trusted their advisors to a large extent and were 
not much personally involved. 
 Clinton started out with a goal of putting a non-judge on the Court. When he 
failed to do so because several of his candidates turned down the offers, progress was 
halted and the process was drawn out. Clinton even sat down to read the writings of 
candidates to consider their judicial philosophy. When he appointed Ginsburg and 
Breyer, Democrats were in the majority in the Senate and he faced less opposition than 
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Reagan and George H. W. Bush. Clinton personally interviewed both his nominees. As 
the first Democratic president able to appoint a justice since Lyndon Johnson, Clinton did 
succeed in avoiding controversy, and his appointees have generally turned out to vote 
with the liberal wing of the Court.  
 Nixon, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush were all committed to 
appointing justices with conservative philosophies. Nixon’s involvement varied: He was 
adamant about appointing strict constructionist Southern justices, but let aides and the 
Department of Justice vet candidates. When needed, he intervened and interviewed 
candidates or persuaded them to accept the nomination. He had a good relationship with 
Burger, and they met several times to discuss judicial matters before and after Burger’s 
appointment. He also interviewed Blackmun, but did not talk to Powell until the latter 
had turned down the offer from the Attorney General, and Nixon had to phone him to 
persuade him to change his mind.  
George H. W. Bush trusted his advisors and especially White House Chief of 
Staff John Sununu when picking Souter. The choice of Thomas for the next vacant seat 
was made easy by the fact that he was young, conservative, and black. Although Bush sat 
down and discussed possible options with his vetting team, his decisions were shaped by 
how candidates were vetoed and promoted by members of his team, in the cases of 
candidates Starr and Souter. When the choice was made, Bush stuck with Thomas and 
promoted him throughout the process. George W. Bush’s vetting processes followed a 
similar pattern to his father. He listened to worried conservatives in choosing not to 
nominate Gonzales. But in the case of Miers, he went along with the nomination despite 
warnings. His team thoroughly interviewed candidates before he talked to them. Despite 
the rhetoric about their commitment to appointing strict constructionist judges, Nixon, 
Bush, Sr., and Bush, Jr., relied to a large extent on their vetting teams. They all 
nominated candidates that conservatives would criticize either at the time or after they 
took their seats.  
 Ford and Reagan had a more hands-off approach to the nominations. Ford only 
appointed one justice, Stevens, and trusted his Attorney General’s judgment to a large 
degree. He did not interview Stevens before calling him to offer the nomination. Ford 
was also constrained by difficult political circumstances. Reagan’s appointments were 
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also influenced heavily by forces in his administration. The White House staff and the 
Department of Justice were in conflict about candidates, and Reagan was not eager to 
pick sides, as argued by his biographer Cannon. This made the process confusing at 
times, and Reagan did not heed the warnings about nominating Bork. He was also late in 
reacting to the massive campaign against Bork.  
Richard Davis labels nominations as either constituency choices or consensus 
choices (61). He argues that a president will try to nominate someone who has the 
ideology to satisfy his constituency if he is running for re-election or has enough support 
in the Senate, while if he is faced with opposition or needs to build alliances he will pick 
a nominee that is likely to achieve consensus support. This view provides a useful 
dichotomy and works well on constituency candidates like Bork or consensual candidates 
like Stevens and Kennedy, but it is complicated by nominations that have aspects of both 
categories or have failed to satisfy the constituencies they were meant to appeal to. The 
nomination of Thomas tried to exploit Democrats’ expected support of minorities, 
although he was an ideological candidate. Miers was presented as a woman and a 
conservative, but failed to convince Bush’s own conservative constituency.  
Henry J. Abraham uses four different motivations for the president: Objective 
merit, personal friendship, balancing representation or representativeness on the Court, 
and real political and ideological compatibility (5). These are valuable additions to 
Davis’s categories. Several nominations were influenced by friendship or personal 
connections. Nixon knew Burger before he nominated him, and Burger’s advice played a 
part in the nomination of Blackmun as well as Rehnquist’s promotion to Chief Justice. 
Clinton wanted to appoint fellow Arkansan Richard Arnold, and George W. Bush 
nominated his close advisor Harriet Miers. Some nominees are recognized by both parties 
for their merits, as in the cases of Powell, Bork, and Roberts. Yet in most nominations the 
president is limited by factors outside his control which limits the number of candidates 
early in the process.  
The data from this period are inconclusive about how the personal involvement of 
the president influences the outcome. Although Clinton managed to appoint two justices 
who are now considered liberal, the political climate was friendlier than for many of the 
other presidents since his nominations occurred before the Republican takeover of 
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Congress in 1994. The amount of time Clinton dedicated to deciding on his first nominee 
proves that his approach had its weaknesses. The record of the less involved presidents is 
also inconclusive: Far from all of Nixon’s, Ford’s, Reagan’s, or George H. W. Bush’s 
appointments turned out to meet the expectations of conservatives. Whether the handling 
of the nomination by the president was orderly or chaotic does not seem to guarantee that 
the nominee will turn out the way the president hoped. 
 
9.5 The Senate  
The meaning of the “advice and consent” clause in the Constitution has been heavily 
debated over the years. The Senate has asserted its authority by conducting thorough 
hearings and rejecting nominees. Nixon attacked Senators for interfering with his powers 
to appoint but was heavily criticized. In the Judiciary Committee hearings, the members 
are free to ask the nominee detailed questions, as well as trying to make a good 
impression in front of the television cameras. Senators that are not on the Judiciary 
Committee can also wield their influence in making statements to the media and 
participating in the final vote. 
During the most controversial hearings in this period, those of Bork and Thomas, 
senators asked detailed and personal questions knowing that millions were watching. 
Epstein and Segal argue that the charge from Bork and various other players that the 
process has become “political” is a well-known fact and that the process always has been 
political (143). Senator Biden, who was chairman of the Judiciary Committee, was still 
engaged in his presidential campaign when Bork was nominated. It would be hard for 
him not to take the campaign into account as the process went along. Similarly one can 
expect that senators who are up for reelection shortly after a nomination will consider 
how voters will react. Mark Silverstein argues that Senate primaries and Senate elections 
have become more partisan, leading to more ideological Senators, a fact which will 
influence the president’s options (190). 
During this period the practice of blocking nominations of lower federal court 
judges increased. Although there had been no filibusters of Supreme Court nominees 
since the Fortas nomination, the prospect seemed more likely than earlier before it was 
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avoided by the bipartisan “gang of 14” in 2005. There was also a national debate about 
not only the filibuster but federal judges and their importance. Representative Tom 
DeLay, the then Republican House Majority Leader, heated up the rhetoric by calling for 
impeachment of liberal judges and saying that they needed to be “intimidated” (Schwartz 
153). Several Republican senators who were eager to satisfy their social conservative 
constituents picked up the rhetoric. Satisfying a partisan constituency was also a concern 
early in the period, and it convinced a Republican senator who had opposed Haynsworth 
that he needed to support Carswell to prove himself (Simon 292).  
 In hindsight statements like those of DeLay may seem exaggerated and even 
embarrassing. But when Republican senators accused Anita Hill of lying or lashed out at 
their Democratic colleagues for what they thought were unfair characteristics of Robert 
Bork, it was because they were defending the nominee from attacks they thought were 
unfair. Similarly, Democratic senators thought that Bork and Thomas did indeed threaten 
the legacy of civil rights and privacy that the Court had established over the course of 
several decades and wanted to use all legitimate means to deny them their seats.  
Senators are simply unable to avoid being “political” as the process itself is 
political. What may be more important to look at is how consistent they are in their 
consideration of nominees. Opposing a nominee on the grounds of well-formulated 
differences of judicial philosophy is very common. Fierce rhetoric and sudden changes of 
mind reflect poorly on the senators when it appears to be in order to prove their 
conservative or liberal credentials.  
 
9.6 News Media and Interest Groups 
Richard Nixon’s White House Office of Communications began the practice of treating 
nomination like election campaigns. The office distributed information about the 
nominee to the media and promoted the nominee through leaflets and letters to the editor. 
By using the same tactics as grass-roots election campaigns, it reached a wider audience 
than would normally rally for or against a judicial nominee. By bringing aboard interest 
groups that share the president’s values, a president can have a great number of 
supporters committed to the nominee from the day the nomination is announced. The 
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president’s press conferences are covered by the news media, and he can ask senators to 
help him promote a nominee.  
 Supreme Court nominations include several aspects that make them interesting for 
the news media. Powerful actors like the president and senators are part of the process 
and are eager to provide the press with endorsements and statements of opposition. The 
nominee is likely to be serving for decades on a court that deals with important and 
divisive questions of economics, crime, culture, and values. Nominees are in most cases 
unknown to the public, and both sides fight to label them in a certain way.  
 The nomination of Robert Bork is frequently used as an example of how a 
targeted campaign can influence the outcome of a nomination. There were, however, 
controversies in the news media and heavy interest group involvement in nominations 
prior to Bork. The nomination of G. Harrold Carswell failed because there were several 
revelations of statements he had made in the news media, and interest groups were vocal 
in denouncing those views. In Bork’s case there was a combination of factors that led to 
the failure of his nomination. His nomination had been expected for several years, and 
both interest groups and the Democrats were well prepared. A Democratic majority in the 
Senate and Bork’s long public record made it easy to find statements in his past that were 
unfavorable. The nomination of Clarence Thomas brought two additional factors that the 
news media could not resist: race and sex.  
 Laurence Tribe stated in 1992 that the “new visibility of the nomination process 
… has undoubtedly produced changes in the way that nominees are selected and 
packaged by the White House and in the manner that nominees present themselves to the 
Senate and the Nation” (Simon 14). That visibility takes away much of the nominee’s 
privacy. Potter Stewart turned down a nomination for Chief Justice because of the media 
attention, and Harry Blackmun was frustrated by how his 85 year-old mother was 
approached by the media. If any of them had been nominated after Thomas, they might 
have been less inclined to accept the offer. The president might also choose to avoid 
potential well-qualified nominees who have even the slightest record of controversy in 
their pasts.  
 Prior to Reagan presidents rarely made more than a couple of public statements in 
support of a nominee. Reagan and George H. W. Bush mentioned Bork and Thomas 
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respectively 32 and 24 times (Maltese 115). Davis finds a 38% increase in the number of 
articles on nominees in The New York Times after Bork, and a 115% increase in Time 
Magazine (98) (Appendix 3). 
 Interest groups influence the process by paying for advertising, appearing in the 
media, testifying before the Senate, and urging their members to contact their senators. 
The participation of organizations in the hearings was infrequent until the Haynsworth 
nomination, after which only the Blackmun hearing had no organizations testifying. The 
Thomas hearings had a total of 43 testimonies from organizations and although the 
number varies it became common in this period (Maltese 91).  
George W. Bush consulted members of the Federalist Society about several of his 
potential nominees. As the issue of abortion became prominent after Roe v. Wade, 
religious groups became more involved. During the nomination of Harriet Miers, James 
Dobson’s statements suggested that he had received an assurance by the White House or 
by Miers that she would oppose Roe v. Wade. Dobson is the head of the conservative 
group Focus on the Family. Several interest groups have grown out of Court decisions. 
Since the question of the legality of abortion was decided by the Court, both opponents 
and proponents direct their efforts toward the Court with the hope of either upholding the 
decision or overturning it. The possibility that the Court might take an abortion case 
again motivates the work of these groups. The interest groups also serve a purpose in 
researching the nominees, and supplementing the work done by the staff of senators as 
argued by Davis (111).  
 The American Bar Associations is viewed very critically by Republicans since 
they perceive it to have a liberal bias. Its ratings of nominees, and in some cases potential 
candidates, receive attention from both senators and the news media. A rating lower than 
“well qualified” is viewed as a disadvantage. A.B.A.’s conflict with Republicans was 
evident with Nixon’s threats of calling members of its rating committee to testify under 
oath, as well as George W. Bush’s exclusion of them from the screening process.  
 Information from interest groups cannot always be trusted, and since they are 
important players both in their statements to the media, their advertising, and their work 
with senators, such information should always be viewed critically. Several senators 
dwelled on the revelations of Haynsworth’s finances and Alito’s membership in a 
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conservative alumni organization. Yet for Haynsworth there was a lack of evidence of 
serious wrongdoing and Alito’s association with the organization proved not to be 
substantial. The nature of the allegations against Thomas was not well suited for a Senate 
hearing, and the result did not establish what had actually happened. When a seat on the 
Supreme Court is at stake it is not surprising that various interest groups will use the 
means necessary to show a nominee in the best or worst possible light. And the news 
media will cover any such controversy or allegation, making it an issue regardless of its 
relevance to the nominee’s judicial merits. Such similarities between the nomination 
process and political campaigns have increased during this period. 
  
9.7 Qualifications 
Presidents and senators often state that the qualifications of a nominee are their main 
concern. In that case there should be a correlation between qualifications and the rate of 
success. Measuring the objective qualifications of a nominee is difficult. Experience as a 
judge, administrative and political experience, education and skills in law, ability to 
write, and teaching experience are some of the qualifications that have been promoted for 
the nominees. All the current members of the Court have served as judges on federal 
appeals courts. Of the twenty nominations covered, only William Rehnquist, Lewis 
Powell, and Harriet Miers had never been judges.  
 The high frequency of justices with experience as judges is a recent phenomenon. 
The backgrounds of the members of the Warren Court were much more varied. William 
O. Douglas was a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Hugo 
Black was a former Senator, Earl Warren was a former governor of California, and Byron 
White was a former football star and Deputy Attorney General under President Kennedy. 
There appears to be several reasons for this development. Richard Nixon stated that he 
wanted justices that were “strict constructionists.” Judges have written opinions that can 
be examined for signs of their judicial philosophy. Nixon admired the writings and 
speeches of Warren Burger and had no reason to doubt what kind of philosophy he would 
bring to the Court. Judges might be viewed as safer choices than people with other 
backgrounds, because it is more difficult to know how they would act as judges. 
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Warren’s activism, which surprised many, probably made Nixon skeptical toward non-
judges. 
 Several nominees have received some criticism regarding their qualifications or 
experience, including G. Harrold Carswell, Sandra Day O’Connor, William Rehnquist, 
Clarence Thomas, and Harriet Miers. Carswell, Nixon’s hurried choice after the failed 
Haynsworth nomination, had just been appointed to the Fifth Circuit Court and had less 
experience than many previous nominees. Sandra Day O’Connor had no experience from 
the federal judiciary but was a Stanford graduate like Rehnquist, and had been a majority 
leader in the Arizona state senate as well as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals. Her 
qualifications were not impressive compared to earlier nominees, but the fact that she was 
a woman had made it harder for her to get work and experience. William Rehnquist and 
Harriet Miers were met with skepticism. The A.B.A. committee was not unanimous in 
their rating of Rehnquist, after Nixon with the help of the conservative Democrat and 
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee James Eastland had threatened to subpoena them to 
testify if they did not give him the highest rating. Miers withdrew because she received 
criticism from both Democrats and Republicans regarding her lack of a judicial record 
and any record of her judicial philosophy. Although she was a skilled lawyer and a 
partner at a major law firm, she had not argued any important cases. Clarence Thomas 
was very young at 43 and had very limited experience as a judge.  
Not all of the nominees had been judges for long, at least not on the federal 
appeals courts. Douglas Ginsburg, Clarence Thomas, and John Roberts had been on the 
D.C. Circuit Court for less than two years, and David Souter had been appointed to the 
First Circuit Court less than a year before his nomination to the Supreme Court. The 
Reagan administration began a conscious strategy of promoting young conservatives to 
the federal courts and then to watch them with future Supreme Court vacancy in mind. 
Judicial experience seems to be respected even by critics, and as long as the nominee has 
such experience, potential criticism often focuses on other aspects, in most cases 
ideology. Lewis Powell and John Roberts were perceived as well-qualified because of 
their extensive work as lawyers. Powell, who had not been a judge, had been a private 
attorney and president of the A.B.A. His lack of experience as a judge was outweighed by 
his long career and his well-known work for several organizations and corporations. 
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Roberts was respected for his frequent appearances as an attorney before the Supreme 
Court.  
Carswell and Miers, who received the most intense criticism for their lack of 
qualifications, failed to be confirmed. Rehnquist and Thomas, who were confirmed 
against a number of votes, were also hurt by allegations of racism and sexism which 
makes it harder to judge to which extent their qualifications affected the vote. Powell, 
Stevens, R. B. Ginsburg, Breyer, and Roberts, all received a great amount of praise from 
both parties for their qualifications, and with the exception of Roberts, they were all 
confirmed by 87 or more votes.  
There appears to be a positive correlation between the votes a nominee receives 
and the expressed support for his or her qualifications by senators, the media, and interest 
groups. There are exceptions, which occur in the cases of Bork and Roberts, when 
ideological opponents are more worried about the ideological balance on the Court than 
by his or her qualifications. A problematic aspect in arguing for such a correlation is the 
fact that there is no uniform standard for measuring the merits of a nominee, as argued by 
Davis (43). No one can know for certain how a nominee will vote on the Court, and it is 
also difficult to know whether that person will write quality opinions or get along well 
enough with the other justices to build alliances and promote his or her views. It is more 
difficult to consider how a non-judge will fare regarding these factors, while a judge will 
likely continue to rule in the same manner he or she has done before. The “safe” choice 
of appointing and confirming candidates that have been judges has emerged as presidents 
and senators have become more concerned with getting ideological allies on the Court. 
Though recent appointees now have judicial experience and are likely to be well trained 
in their reasoning and writing, the diversity of the Court suffers. 
 
9.8 Controversies 
If there are controversial revelations about the nominee, confirmation becomes much less 
likely. The nominations of Haynsworth, Carswell, Rehnquist, D. Ginsburg, and Thomas 
were all influenced by matters not strictly related to their judicial philosophies. Bork’s 
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problems were caused by the long record of his judicial views, and Miers got in trouble 
for the lack of such.  
 Some of these controversies are not related to the nominee’s legal qualifications 
and judicial philosophy. Haynsworth’s financial interests and Ginsburg’s use of 
marihuana may not appear to be particularly damning. But Haynsworth was unlucky with 
the timing of his nomination shortly after Fortas’ resignation for financial involvements. 
D. Ginsburg’s habits were not looked kindly upon considering the conservative attitudes 
toward drug use. His conservative record did not save him. Accusations of attitudes that 
are viewed as unacceptable in society, whether it is racism as in the cases of Carswell and 
Rehnquist or sexism in the case of Thomas, make the vote much closer in the Senate if 
the nominee is confirmed at all.  
A nominee’s legal philosophy has in most cases failed to sink a nomination. 
Opponents have in each nominations expressed concern by the nominee’s record, 
whether it is perceived as too conservative or too liberal. We cannot know if Bork, if he 
had been confirmed, would have turned out to be more conservative than Scalia or 
Thomas. Bork’s problem was that his public record was longer and more detailed than 
those of Scalia and Thomas. Miers, whose views were largely unknown, appears to be an 
exception. Candidates with few records like Kennedy and Souter were easily confirmed, 
but when Miers was nominated the conservative movement managed to stop her. The 
opposition can to some extent be explained by her lack of judicial experience compared 
to Kennedy and Souter, but conservatives had become better organized and more 
involved in judicial nominations by the time she was nominated.  
Controversy is not created out of nothing. In several of the cases the failure was 
labeled as unfair by supporters of the nominee. But Bork’s record of statements was very 
specific regarding his conservative judicial philosophy and did not square with his 
testimony. The charges against Thomas were supported by other women than Anita Hill. 
Miers had little judicial experience. The fact that this information was thoroughly 
covered in the media and brought up by senators should have been expected. Although a 
senate hearing might not be a good setting to investigate allegations of the nature of those 
leveled against Thomas, it should be expected, especially after Bork. Most nominees own 
stock and do not get in trouble for it. Fortas’ resignation after his dealings with an 
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investor raised the bar for a period and helped sink Haynsworth’s nomination. 
Haynsworth might have met resistance regardless since Democrats were eager for a fight, 
but his involvements added to the damage. Harry Blackmun, who eventually was 
confirmed for the same vacancy, was not questioned much about his investments.  
Haynsworth’s investments and D. Ginsburg’s marihuana use might have been the 
least judicially relevant of the controversies in this period. Although criticism is brought 
by opponents who may use any unfavorable argument, in most cases it dealt with matters 
related to how the nominee would perform in his or her job if confirmed. Bork’s 
supporters might contend that he was brought down by a targeted and well planned 
campaign, but the criticism was founded on his judicial philosophy. In the current system, 
presidents and nominees should expect such a level of inquiry.  
 
9.9 Concluding Remarks 
The literature on the Supreme Court generally agrees that nominations have become more 
contested and that they represent a higher priority for both parties since Nixon’s 
presidency. The reasons given for this development vary. After analyzing the twenty 
nominations in this period, we see that some factors have become apparent. 
 The president will not always make the most rational and non-controversial 
choice. Several nominees have characteristics that one would expect to meet opposition. 
The president is influenced to make such choices either by his own conviction, at the 
urging of advisors, by expectations considering the certain traits in outgoing justice, or 
expectations from a particular constituency. Despite the growing amount of research in 
the field, and after the much debated failure of the Bork nomination, later presidents have 
still not been able to avoid embarrassment from their nominations. 
 The increased coverage by the news media and investigations into the candidates’ 
backgrounds will rarely defeat a nominee based on information that is unrelated to his or 
her judicial philosophy or lack of such. Several justices have expressed concern about the 
increased publicity. Yet the controversies that arise from revelations have mostly been 
relevant to the question of how the nominee would act as a justice. The involvement of 
more interest groups has made the process increasingly similar to a political campaign. 
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 The Senate hearings are widely covered in the news media, but a national debate 
about judicial ideology similar to the one that followed the Bork hearings has not 
occurred again in the same degree. Unless there is a controversial revelation, the news 
media focus mainly on the nomination announcement and a small part of the testimony 
by the nominee. 
There has been a gradual trend toward selecting nominees that have prior 
experience as federal appeals court judges. Although the Court now has a more pluralistic 
composition regarding religion, gender, and ethnicity compared to 1969, the justices’ 
professional experience is less varied. This is likely caused by the president’s interest in 
nominating candidates who have qualifications that senators will respect and judicial 
records that matches the president’s views. Yet it excludes some perspectives and 
experiences that non-judges could contribute with.  
Republican presidents nominated all but two of the twenty nominees covered. The 
Court gradually became more conservative as presidents focused more on ideology. Yet 
the turn took decades and several nominees have turned out less conservative than 
expected. 
As long as a nominee is perceived to have sufficient judicial experience and has 
not conducted himself or herself in a controversial manner, he or she has good chances to 
be confirmed.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Public Statements of Support from the Presidents Who Nominated 
Them 
 
(Maltese 115) 
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Appendix 2: Public Hearings on Supreme Court Nominees 
 
(Maltese 90-91) 
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Appendix 3: Changes in Number of New York Times and Time Magazine Stories of 
Supreme Court Nominations before and after Bork Nomination Process 
 
 
(Davis 98) 
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